Constitutional Doctrines Arising from the First Four Parts of the Indian Constitution

The first four parts of the Constitution of India — Part I (Union and its Territory), Part II (Citizenship), Part III (Fundamental Rights), and Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy) — lay the foundational framework of the polity. Several important constitutional doctrines have emerged from the judicial interpretation of these parts. 

1. Doctrines arising from Part I – The Union and its Territory (Articles 1–4)

(a) Doctrine of Territorial Nexus 

• Meaning: The State can make laws having extraterritorial operation if there exists a real and sufficien nexus between the subject-matter and the State. 
• Case Law: State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (1957 AIR 699) — The Supreme Court upheld that
  the State could regulate activities outside its territory if they
  have a substantial connection within it.

(b) Doctrine of Indestructible Union with a Flexible Federation 

• Though India is federal in structure, the Union is indestructible while States’ boundaries can be altered. 
• Case Law: State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963 AIR 1241) — The Court held that Parliament has supremacy in altering state boundaries under Article 3, emphasizing India’s quasi-federal nature. 

2. Doctrines arising from Part II –Citizenship (Articles 5–11)

(a) Doctrine of Single Citizenship 

• India provides for single citizenship, ensuring national unity and avoiding parochial loyalties. 
• Rationale: All Indians are citizens of India, not of any State, promoting unity and equality before law.

(b) Doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy in Citizenship Matters 

• Article 11 empowers Parliament to regulate citizenship by law, reflecting the flexibility of citizenship rules through legislation (e.g., Citizenship Act, 1955). 

3. Doctrines arising from Part III –Fundamental Rights (Articles 12–35)

(a) Doctrine of Severability 

• If part of a law is unconstitutional, the valid portion can survive if it is separable. 
• Case Law: R.M.D.C. v. Union of India (1957 AIR 628).

(b) Doctrine of Eclipse 

• A pre-constitutional law inconsistent with Fundamental Rights becomes dormant but not dead; it can revive if inconsistency is removed. 
• Case Law: Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P. (1955 AIR 781).

(c) Doctrine of Waiver 

• A person cannot waive Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution. 
• Case Law: Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1959 AIR 149).

(d) Doctrine of Reasonable Classification and Equality 

• Article 14 permits classification if it is reasonable and has nexus with the object sought. 
• Case Law: State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952 AIR 75).

(e) Doctrine of Basic Structure 

• Fundamental Rights form part of the Constitution’s basic structure and cannot be destroyed by amendment. 
• Case Law: Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973 AIR 1461).

(f) Doctrine of Pith and Substance & Colorable Legislation 

• Applied when testing the validity of laws vis-à-vis legislative competence under Fundamental Rights. 
• Case Law: State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951 AIR 318).

(g) Doctrine of Proportionality 

• Restrictions on Fundamental Rights must be proportionate to the object sought to be achieved. 
• Case Law: Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353. 

4. Doctrines arising from Part IV – Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 36–51)

(a) Doctrine of Harmonious Construction 

• Courts must interpret Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles harmoniously. 
• Case Law: Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980 AIR 1789).

(b) Doctrine of Socio-Economic Justice 

• Derived from the DPSPs to guide the State towards a welfare and equitable society. 
• Case Law: State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976 AIR 490).

(c) Doctrine of Non-Justiciability of DPSPs 

• DPSPs are not enforceable in courts but are fundamental to governance. 
• Article 37 clarifies their non-justiciable yet binding nature. 

Conclusion

The first four parts of the Constitution collectively establish the territorial, civic, and moral framework of the Republic. From these, doctrines like territorial nexus, severability, eclipse, basic structure, and harmonious construction emerge — forming the intellectual bedrock of India’s constitutional jurisprudence.

Child Labour in Firecracker Factories — Remedies and Legal Measures

1. Introduction

Child labour is one of the gravest social and constitutional wrongs in India.

Despite several laws prohibiting the employment of children in hazardous industries, the practice continues in many sectors, including the firecracker industry.

The Indian Constitution enshrines the protection of children from economic exploitation and hazardous employment as a Fundamental Right, and the judiciary has treated violations as an affront to human dignity.

In this case, a group of postgraduate law students discovered children aged 12–15 working regularly in firecracker factories — a situation that calls for immediate legal intervention and social awareness.

2. Constitutional and Legal Framework

2.1 Constitutional Provisions

1. Article 24 – Prohibits the employment of children below 14 years of age in any factory, mine, or hazardous occupation.
2. Article 39(e) and (f) – Direct the State to ensure that children are not forced by economic necessity to enter vocations unsuited to their age or strength and that they develop in conditions of freedom and dignity.
3. Article 21A – Guarantees free and compulsory education to all children between 6–14 years.
4. Article 23 – Prohibits trafficking and forced labour, which includes the exploitation of children under compulsion or poverty.

Together, these provisions form a constitutional shield against child labour.

2.2 Statutory Provisions

1. Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 (as amended in 2016)

Prohibits employment of children below 14 years in any occupation.

Allows adolescents (14–18 years) to work only in non-hazardous occupations.

Firecracker manufacturing is specifically listed as hazardous work under the Schedule.

Provides penalties: imprisonment up to 2 years and fines up to ₹50,000 for employers.

1. Factories Act, 1948 (Section 67) – Prohibits employment of children below 14 years in any factory.
2. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015Treats a working child as a “child in need of care and protection” (Section 2(14)). Provides mechanisms for rescue, rehabilitation, and prosecution of offenders.

3. Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009

Ensures that children aged 6–14 attend school rather than work. Imposes duties on local authorities and parents to enforce attendance.

3. Judicial Interpretation and Activism (FIRAC)

3.1 M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996)

Facts:
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was filed concerning child labour in match and firecracker factories in Sivakasi, Tamil Nadu.

Issue:
Whether the employment of children in hazardous industries violated their Fundamental Rights.

Rule:
Articles 24, 39(e)-(f), and 45 impose an obligation on the State to protect children from exploitation and provide education.

Application:
The Supreme Court ordered:

• Immediate prohibition of child labour in hazardous industries.
• Establishment of a Child Labour Rehabilitation Welfare Fund.
• Payment of compensation of ₹20,000 per child by offending employers.
• Provision of alternative employment to adult family members.

Conclusion:
This case became the cornerstone of child labour jurisprudence, transforming constitutional directives into enforceable obligations through judicial intervention.

3.2 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984)

Facts:
The petitioner organization filed a PIL to free bonded labourers, including children, working in quarries and factories.

Issue:
Whether forced and exploitative labour violates Fundamental Rights.

Rule:
The right to live with human dignity under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood, health, and protection from exploitation.

Application:
The Court ordered the release and rehabilitation of labourers and emphasized that child labour violates Articles 21, 23, and 24.

Conclusion:
The judgment expanded Article 21 to include freedom from economic and physical exploitation as part of human dignity.

4. Role of the Law Students and Remedies Available

4.1 Legal Remedies

1. Public Interest Litigation (PIL)

The students can file a PIL under Article 32 or 226 before the Supreme Court or High Court.

The petition can seek directions for: (1) Immediate rescue of child workers. (2) Closure of illegally operating firecracker units. (3) Strict enforcement of the Child and Adolescent Labour Act. (4) Rehabilitation and education of affected children.

The Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta recognized the locus standi of social activists and students in such matters.

2. Complaint to Local Authorities

Report the violation to the District Magistrate, Labour Inspector, or Child Welfare Committee (CWC) under the JJ Act.

These authorities have the power to rescue and rehabilitate child labourers.

3. Approach to the National and State Commissions

Complaints may be lodged before the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) or the State Commission, which can initiate inquiries under Section 13 of the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005.

4. Filing FIR under Section 14 of the Child Labour Act

The students can assist NGOs or authorities in filing a criminal complaint against the factory owners employing children.

The offence is cognizable and non-bailable.

4.2 Social and Educational Support

Beyond legal action, the students can:

1. Coordinate with NGOs such as Bachpan Bachao Andolan or Childline 1098 to facilitate rescue and rehabilitation.
2. Assist rescued children in school enrolment under the RTE Act, 2009.
3. Conduct awareness programs in the locality to sensitize employers and parents about child rights and penalties for violations.

Such actions align with the Fundamental Duty under Article 51-A(e) and (k) — promoting human compassion and providing education to children.

5. Conclusion

The employment of children in firecracker factories is a gross violation of constitutional and human rights.

The law students, acting as socially conscious citizens, can play a vital role by invoking the judiciary’s Public Interest Litigation jurisdiction, assisting enforcement authorities, and spreading awareness.

The constitutional mandate under Articles 21, 23, 24, and 39(f) obligates the State to ensure that no child is deprived of education, safety, or dignity due to poverty or exploitation.

Through active intervention, these students uphold the spirit of the Constitution — that every child must live with freedom, dignity, and hope for a better future. 

1. Introduction

The Doctrine of Reasonable Classification is the cornerstone of the equality clause under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
Article 14 guarantees that “the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”
Since absolute equality is neither possible nor desirable, the courts have interpreted this provision to allow reasonable classification—that is, distinctions among persons or things based on rational criteria that serve a legitimate purpose.

2. Constitutional Foundation

2.1 Article 14 and Equality

Article 14 embodies two concepts:

1. Equality before law – a negative concept implying absence of special privileges.
2. Equal protection of laws – a positive concept requiring equal treatment of those similarly situated.

To apply laws fairly, the State may classify persons or objects into groups, but such classification must satisfy the test of reasonableness.

3. Judicial Development (FIRAC)

3.1 State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)

Facts:
The Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, empowered the State Government to refer any case to a special court for speedy trial. The petitioner alleged discrimination.

Issue:
Whether the Act violated Article 14 by allowing arbitrary selection of cases.

Rule:
A classification must be based on intelligible differentia and the differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.

Application:
The Court found that the Act gave unguided discretion to the executive without any reasonable basis for selecting cases.

Conclusion:
The Act was struck down as violating Article 14.

This case laid the foundation of the two-fold test for reasonable classification.

3.2 Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar (1955)

Facts:
Section 30 of the Criminal Procedure Code allowed certain cases to be tried by a single judge instead of a bench. The petitioners claimed inequality.

Issue:
Whether this procedural differentiation offended Article 14.

Rule:
Equality does not forbid reasonable classification; it forbids class legislation.

Application:
The Court upheld the provision, holding that the classification was based on the nature of the offence and the object of speedy trial, satisfying both limbs of the test.

Conclusion:
The Court reaffirmed that classification is permissible if founded on an intelligible differentia having a rational relation to the law’s purpose.

3.3 Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (1958)

Facts:
A commission was set up to investigate the affairs of certain companies. The petitioner contended that singling out specific companies violated Article 14.

Issue:
Whether selective investigation amounted to unconstitutional discrimination.

Rule:
The Court elaborated comprehensive principles of classification under Article 14.

Application:
It held that classification is valid if it is based on a real distinction relevant to the object of the law and not arbitrary, artificial, or evasive.

Conclusion:
This case became the leading authority defining the scope and limits of reasonable classification in India.

4. Essential Conditions for Reasonable Classification

For a law to withstand scrutiny under Article 14, two conditions must coexist:

1. Intelligible Differentia:

   The classification must distinguish persons, groups, or things on a rational basis—such as occupation, purpose, or circumstance.

2. Rational Nexus:

   There must be a logical relationship between the basis of classification and the objective the statute seeks to achieve.

If either condition fails, the classification becomes arbitrary and violates Article 14.

The judiciary later supplemented this doctrine with the principle of non-arbitrariness, introduced in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974), holding that “arbitrariness is the very negation of equality.”

5. Conclusion

The Doctrine of Reasonable Classification allows the State to treat different situations differently, provided such differentiation is rational, non-arbitrary, and linked to a legitimate public purpose.

Through decisions such as Anwar Ali Sarkar, Budhan Choudhry, and Ram Krishna Dalmia, the Supreme Court established a balanced approach—preserving equality while permitting necessary legislative flexibility.

Modern jurisprudence, particularly after E.P. Royappa and Maneka Gandhi, has transformed Article 14 from a static equality clause into a dynamic guarantee of fairness and reasonableness in all State action. 

Right to Education

1. Introduction

The Right to Education (RTE) is one of the most significant socio-economic rights recognized by the Indian Constitution.

It ensures that every child has access to free and compulsory education, promoting equality and empowerment.

Education is not merely a privilege but a constitutional guarantee essential for the realization of other Fundamental Rights.

Over time, judicial interpretation and constitutional amendments have elevated education from a Directive Principle to a Fundamental Right.

2. Constitutional Provisions

2.1 Article 21-A

Inserted by the 86th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002, Article 21-A states:

“The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine.”

This Article made the Right to Education a Fundamental Right, enforceable in a court of law.

2.2 Directive Principles of State Policy

Before its inclusion as a Fundamental Right, education was a directive principle under Article 45, which directed the State to provide free and compulsory education for children up to the age of 14 years.

The 86th Amendment also substituted Article 45 to focus on early childhood care and education for children below the age of six.

2.3 Fundamental Duty

Under Article 51-A(k), it is the fundamental duty of every parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to their children between the ages of six and fourteen years.

3. Judicial Development (FIRAC)

3.1 Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992)

Facts:
The petitioner challenged the capitation fee system in private medical colleges, arguing that it violated the right to education and equality.

Issue:
Whether the right to education is a Fundamental Right under the Constitution.

Rule:
The right to education is implicit in the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21.

Application:
The Court held that without education, the right to life would be meaningless. Education is necessary for human development and participation in society.

Conclusion:
The Court recognized the Right to Education as part of the Right to Life under Article 21, marking a major expansion of constitutional jurisprudence.

3.2 Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993)

Facts:
The validity of capitation fee and admission schemes in private educational institutions was challenged.

Issue:
Whether the right to education is a Fundamental Right and to what extent it is enforceable.

Rule:
The right to education up to the age of 14 years is a Fundamental Right under Article 21, read with Article 45.

Application:
The Court held that education up to 14 years must be free and compulsory, and beyond that, it is subject to the State’s economic capacity and development.

Conclusion:
This case laid the foundation for Article 21-A, later incorporated by the 86th Amendment.

3.3 Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014)

Facts:
Private unaided schools challenged the applicability of the Right to Education Act, 2009, to their institutions.

Issue:
Whether imposing RTE obligations on private unaided schools violated their rights under Article 19(1)(g).

Rule:
The Right to Education Act is constitutionally valid as it seeks to promote equality and social justice.

Application:
The Court upheld the 25% reservation for economically weaker sections in private schools.

Conclusion:
The Court reaffirmed the State’s obligation and the shared responsibility of private institutions in ensuring universal education.

4. Legislative Implementation

The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 operationalizes Article 21-A.

Its key features include:

1. Free and compulsory education for all children aged 6 to 14 years.
2. Prohibition of physical punishment and screening procedures.
3. 25% reservation for disadvantaged groups in private unaided schools.
4. Provision for neighborhood schools and maintenance of minimum infrastructure standards.

The Act ensures accountability of both government and private schools in achieving inclusive and equitable education.

5. Conclusion

The Right to Education is a transformative constitutional guarantee ensuring equality, empowerment, and human dignity.

It bridges the gap between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, fulfilling the vision of a welfare state.

Through judicial activism and legislative reform, education has evolved into a tool for social justice, economic progress, and constitutional morality.

It stands today as one of the most powerful rights that enables the realization of all other rights — the true foundation of an enlightened and democratic society. 

Laws in Derogation with Fundamental Rights

1. Introduction

The Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Indian Constitution (Articles 12–35) are the cornerstone of India’s democratic framework.

They act as limitations on the powers of the legislature and the executive.

However, the Constitution itself provides certain exceptions where Parliament or State legislatures may enact laws derogating from Fundamental Rights in specified circumstances.

Such derogations are permitted to ensure national security, public order, and constitutional balance during emergencies or special situations.

2. Constitutional Basis for Laws in Derogation

2.1 Article 13 — General Limitation

Article 13 declares that any law inconsistent with Fundamental Rights shall be void to the extent of its inconsistency.

However, the Constitution also provides explicit exceptions through other articles such as Article 33, Article 34, and Article 359, which authorize certain derogations.

2.2 Article 33 — Power to Modify Fundamental Rights in Armed Forces

Article 33 empowers Parliament to restrict or abrogate the Fundamental Rights of the members of the Armed Forces, police forces, and intelligence agencies in the interest of discipline, public order, and national security.

This ensures that the functioning of disciplined forces is not obstructed by the unqualified exercise of rights that might otherwise be available to ordinary citizens.

Case Law: Ram Sarup v. Union of India (1965)

Facts:
A soldier convicted by a court-martial challenged the validity of his conviction on the ground that it violated his Fundamental Rights under Article 14.

Issue:
Whether laws governing the armed forces could restrict Fundamental Rights under Article 33.

Rule:
Article 33 authorizes Parliament to restrict or abrogate rights to maintain discipline in the armed forces.

Application:
The Supreme Court upheld the Armed Forces Act provisions, holding that such restrictions were necessary for ensuring discipline and efficiency.

Conclusion:
The case affirmed that Article 33 is a constitutional safeguard allowing Parliament to impose reasonable restrictions on Fundamental Rights in the interest of national defense.

2.3 Article 34 — Restriction of Rights during Martial Law

Article 34 authorizes Parliament to indemnify public officials or members of the armed forces for actions taken during the operation of martial law.

It permits the temporary suspension of Fundamental Rights in areas where martial law has been declared due to breakdown of law and order.

This provision recognizes that extraordinary situations may demand extraordinary measures, balancing civil liberties with the necessity of restoring peace.

2.4 Article 359 — Suspension of Fundamental Rights during Emergency

Article 359 empowers the President to suspend the enforcement of Fundamental Rights (except Articles 20 and 21) during a national emergency proclaimed under Article 352.

This means that, while the emergency is in force, a citizen cannot move any court for enforcement of such rights.

Case Law: A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976)

Facts:
During the Emergency (1975–77), several political leaders were detained without trial and challenged their detention under Article 21.

Issue:
Whether the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 could be suspended during an emergency under Article 359.

Rule:
The Presidential order suspending the right to move courts for enforcement of Fundamental Rights was valid.

Application:
The majority held that during an emergency, Article 21 could be suspended, and detainees could not challenge their detention.

Conclusion:
This decision permitted total suspension of personal liberty but was later overruled by Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (2017) and Maneka Gandhi (1978) doctrines, reaffirming that the right to life and liberty cannot be extinguished even during an emergency.

3. Judicial Safeguards and Limitations

Although the Constitution allows derogation, the judiciary has imposed safeguards to prevent abuse.

In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court clarified that the right to life and liberty under Article 21 is non-derogable and cannot be suspended even during emergencies.

Further, the 44th Constitutional Amendment (1978) ensured that Articles 20 and 21 can never be suspended, even under Article 359.

This reflects the constitutional evolution toward protecting core human rights against State overreach.

4. Significance of Controlled Derogation

The power to derogate from Fundamental Rights ensures that the State can act effectively in exceptional circumstances such as war, rebellion, or internal disorder.

However, such powers are not absolute — they exist only within the boundaries of constitutional control and judicial review.

Derogations under Articles 33, 34, and 359 are carefully designed to preserve the balance between individual liberty and collective security, ensuring that constitutional democracy survives even during crises.

5. Conclusion

The Constitution of India, while guaranteeing Fundamental Rights, recognizes the necessity of limited derogation in times of national emergency, martial law, or for maintaining discipline in armed forces.

Through Articles 33, 34, and 359, it provides the State with flexibility to respond to extraordinary challenges while maintaining constitutional integrity.

Judicial developments, particularly after the 44th Amendment, reaffirm that the core of human dignity and liberty under Article 21 remains inviolable.

Thus, the framework of derogation upholds the Constitution’s dual purpose — to secure freedom and to preserve the nation. 

Developments of the Right to Life and Personal Liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution

1. Introduction

Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is one of the most dynamic and expansive provisions in the field of Fundamental Rights.

It reads:

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”

Originally interpreted narrowly, Article 21 has undergone remarkable judicial evolution.

From protecting merely physical existence, it has been transformed by the Supreme Court into a reservoir of human rights, encompassing a wide range of rights essential for living a life of dignity.

Through judicial interpretation, Article 21 now represents the constitutional embodiment of the right to life in its broadest sense.

2. Scope of Article 21

2.1 Meaning of “Life”

The term “life” under Article 21 means more than mere animal existence.

It includes all those aspects of life that make it meaningful, complete, and dignified.

The Court has interpreted “life” to include the right to live with human dignity, the right to livelihood, health, environment, shelter, privacy, and education.

2.2 Meaning of “Personal Liberty”

“Personal liberty” includes the freedom of the individual to act and move freely, subject to the procedure established by law.

After judicial expansion, it now encompasses protection from arbitrary arrest, right to privacy, travel, and autonomy in personal choices.

3. Landmark Judicial Developments (FIRAC)

3.1 A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)

Facts:
A.K. Gopalan, a communist leader, was detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and challenged the validity of his detention.

Issue:
Whether preventive detention violated his fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21.

Rule:
Article 21 only requires a “procedure established by law,” not necessarily a fair or reasonable one.

Application:
The Supreme Court adopted a narrow interpretation, holding that as long as there was a law prescribing the procedure for detention, Article 21 was not violated.

Conclusion:
The Court upheld the detention and separated Articles 19 and 21.

This case marked a restrictive phase of Article 21, focusing only on lawful procedure and not on its fairness.

3.2 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

Facts:
The petitioner’s passport was impounded by the government without furnishing reasons or an opportunity to be heard.

Issue:
Whether the expression “procedure established by law” under Article 21 must be fair, just, and reasonable.

Rule:
A law depriving personal liberty must satisfy the tests of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness under Articles 14, 19, and 21 together.

Application:
The Court held that “personal liberty” covers a wide range of rights and that any law affecting it must follow a fair, just, and reasonable procedure.

Conclusion:
This case revolutionized Article 21, converting it from a narrow procedural right into a broad guarantee of substantive due process.

It harmonized Articles 14, 19, and 21 into a golden triangle protecting liberty and dignity.

3.3 Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981)

Facts:
The petitioner, detained under preventive detention laws, challenged restrictions on meeting her family members.

Issue:
Whether such restrictions violated her right to life under Article 21.

Rule:
The right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and access to basic necessities of life.

Application:
The Court held that prisoners retain fundamental rights and that human dignity cannot be curtailed even during lawful detention.

Conclusion:
The decision expanded Article 21 to include the right to humane treatment and the basic requirements of human dignity.

3.4 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985)

Facts:
Pavement dwellers in Mumbai challenged their eviction under municipal laws, claiming it violated their right to livelihood.

Issue:
Whether the right to livelihood is part of the right to life under Article 21.

Rule:
Deprivation of livelihood amounts to deprivation of life itself.

Application:
The Court held that the right to livelihood is an integral part of the right to life since no person can live without means of subsistence.

Conclusion:
This case recognized the right to livelihood as a fundamental aspect of Article 21, merging economic and social rights with civil liberty.

3.5 Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar (1991)

Facts:
A journalist filed a petition complaining that industrial pollution of the Bokaro River violated the right to life.

Issue:
Whether the right to a pollution-free environment is protected under Article 21.

Rule:
The right to life includes the right to enjoy pollution-free water and air for full enjoyment of life.

Application:
The Court held that environmental degradation directly violates Article 21.

Conclusion:
The right to a healthy environment became a part of the right to life, paving the way for environmental jurisprudence in India.

3.6 Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993)

Facts:
The legality of capitation fees in private professional colleges was challenged.

Issue:
Whether the right to education forms part of the right to life under Article 21.

Rule:
The right to education up to the age of 14 is a fundamental right under Article 21, read with Article 45.

Application:
The Court held that without education, the right to life would be meaningless.

Conclusion:
The judgment led to the 86th Constitutional Amendment (2002) inserting Article 21-A, making free and compulsory education a Fundamental Right.

3.7 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

Facts:
The constitutional validity of the Aadhaar scheme and the broader question of the right to privacy were challenged.

Issue:
Whether the right to privacy is a part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.

Rule:
Privacy is an intrinsic part of life and personal liberty and one of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.

Application:
The Court held that privacy includes autonomy, dignity, bodily integrity, and informational control.

Conclusion:
This unanimous nine-judge bench judgment reaffirmed that the right to privacy is a fundamental right implicit in Article 21.

4. Emerging Dimensions of Article 21

Over time, the Supreme Court has recognized numerous derivative rights under Article 21, including:

1. Right to live with human dignity (Francis Coralie Mullin).
2. Right to livelihood (Olga Tellis).
3. Right to a pollution-free environment (Subhash Kumar).
4. Right to shelter (Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., 1996).
5. Right to health and medical care (Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, 1996).
6. Right to privacy (Puttaswamy, 2017).
7. Right to die with dignity (Common Cause v. Union of India, 2018).

These developments show that Article 21 has evolved into a comprehensive guarantee of human dignity and quality of life, integrating civil, political, and socio-economic rights.

5. Conclusion

The evolution of Article 21 represents the transformative and living spirit of the Indian Constitution.

From the restrictive interpretation in A.K. Gopalan to the expansive human-rights-oriented approach in Maneka Gandhi and beyond, the judiciary has ensured that the right to life encompasses every aspect that makes life meaningful and dignified.

Article 21 has become the fountainhead of human rights jurisprudence in India, bridging the gap between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.

It stands today as the most powerful instrument for the protection of human dignity, liberty, and justice in a constitutional democracy. 

Doctrine of Eclipse and Doctrine of Severability

1. Introduction

The Indian Constitution, through Article 13, declares that any law inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights shall be void to the extent of its inconsistency.

To explain how such laws are treated, the Supreme Court has developed two important constitutional doctrines — the Doctrine of Eclipse and the Doctrine of Severability.

These doctrines ensure that unconstitutional laws are handled logically — distinguishing between those that can be revived and those that must be struck down entirely.

2. Doctrine of Eclipse

2.1 Meaning

The Doctrine of Eclipse applies to pre-constitutional laws — laws that were valid when enacted but became inconsistent with Fundamental Rights after the Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950.

According to this doctrine, such laws are not void ab initio (from the beginning); they merely become “eclipsed” by Fundamental Rights.

The shadow of unconstitutionality falls only upon the conflicting part of the law — it remains dormant but not dead, and may revive if the constitutional inconsistency is removed (for example, through an amendment).

2.2 Constitutional Basis

Article 13(1) provides that all laws in force before the commencement of the Constitution, insofar as they are inconsistent with Fundamental Rights, shall be void “to the extent of such inconsistency.”

This means that pre-constitutional laws remain valid for purposes and persons not affected by the inconsistency, particularly for non-citizens.

2.3 Judicial Interpretation

Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1955)

Facts:

The C.P. and Berar Motor Vehicles Act, 1947 empowered the government to take over private transport services. After the Constitution came into force, this provision conflicted with the Fundamental Right to trade under Article 19(1)(g).

Issue:

Whether the impugned law became void after the commencement of the Constitution.

Rule:

A pre-constitutional law inconsistent with Fundamental Rights is not void ab initio but remains dormant and can revive when the inconsistency is removed.

Application:

The Court held that the law was valid before 1950 but became eclipsed after the Constitution. It revived automatically after the First Amendment Act, 1951, which authorized such State monopolies.

Conclusion:

This case established the Doctrine of Eclipse, holding that pre-constitutional laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are only inoperative, not dead.

2.4 Scope and Limitation

The doctrine applies only to pre-constitutional laws and benefits primarily citizens, since Fundamental Rights in Part III protect citizens from State action.

The law may revive automatically once the constitutional impediment is removed, but this doctrine does not apply to post-constitutional laws, which are void from inception if they violate Fundamental Rights.

3. Doctrine of Severability

3.1 Meaning

The Doctrine of Severability (or Separability) deals with laws that are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.

If the valid and invalid parts of a statute can be separated, the valid portion may be upheld while the invalid portion is struck down.

The purpose is to preserve the constitutional part of a law and invalidate only the offending sections.

3.2 Constitutional Basis

Article 13(1) implies that only the inconsistent part of a law shall be void “to the extent of such inconsistency.”

Thus, the Constitution seeks to rectify and preserve legislation instead of nullifying it entirely.

3.3 Judicial Interpretation

R.M.D.C. v. Union of India (1957)

Facts:
The Prize Competitions Act, 1955, regulating gambling competitions, was challenged as violating the freedom of trade under Article 19(1)(g).

Issue:
Whether the entire Act was void or only certain provisions.

Rule:
If the valid and invalid parts of a law can be separated without affecting legislative intent, the valid portion shall be retained.

Application:
The Court held that the unconstitutional provisions could be severed from the valid ones, and the remainder of the Act would continue to operate.

Conclusion:
The Court applied the Doctrine of Severability, upholding only the constitutional portions of the Act.

Another example is A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), where the Supreme Court upheld the valid parts of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, while striking down Section 14 as unconstitutional.

3.4 Tests of Severability

The Court has evolved certain tests to determine whether the valid portion of a statute can survive independently:

1. The valid and invalid parts must be distinct and separable.
2. The valid part must be capable of standing alone and giving effect to the legislative intent.
3. The legislature must have intended to enact the valid portion even without the invalid one.
4. If the two parts are inseparable or interdependent, the entire law becomes void.

4. Distinction Between the Two Doctrines

The Doctrine of Eclipse and the Doctrine of Severability serve different but complementary purposes.

The Doctrine of Eclipse applies to pre-constitutional laws that become dormant due to inconsistency with Fundamental Rights and may be revived once the inconsistency is removed.

In contrast, the Doctrine of Severability applies to both pre- and post-constitutional laws that are partly valid and partly invalid, enabling courts to strike down only the unconstitutional portions.

While the Doctrine of Eclipse temporarily suspends the operation of a law, the Doctrine of Severability preserves the valid portion of legislation, thereby maintaining legislative continuity and constitutional supremacy.

5. Conclusion

Both doctrines reinforce the supremacy of the Constitution and ensure judicial balance between constitutional review and legislative respect.

Through Bhikaji Narain and R.M.D.C., the Supreme Court ensured that invalidity does not unnecessarily destroy entire laws.

The Doctrine of Eclipse suspends pre-constitutional laws until revived, while the Doctrine of Severability saves the constitutional portions of partially invalid laws.

Together, they illustrate the flexible and pragmatic nature of Indian constitutional jurisprudence, promoting both justice and legislative stability. 

Importance of Fundamental Freedoms and Reasonable Restrictions on Freedom of Movement

1. Introduction

The Fundamental Freedoms enshrined in Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution are central to the democratic character of the Republic of India.

They ensure the free expression, movement, association, and livelihood of citizens, which are essential to the functioning of a free and open society.

Among them, the freedom of movement, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d), is a vital element of personal liberty.

However, since absolute freedom can lead to social disorder, the Constitution allows the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest under Article 19(5).

2. Fundamental Freedoms under Article 19(1)

Article 19(1) guarantees six fundamental freedoms to citizens:

1. Freedom of speech and expression.
2. Freedom to assemble peacefully and without arms.
3. Freedom to form associations or unions.
4. Freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India.
5. Freedom to reside and settle in any part of India.
6. Freedom to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business.

These freedoms ensure political, personal, and economic liberty, forming the basis of democratic participation and self-development.

3. Freedom of Movement

3.1 Constitutional Provision

Article 19(1)(d) guarantees to every citizen the right “to move freely throughout the territory of India.”

This freedom includes:

1. The right to travel from one place to another within India.
2. The right to move without unnecessary restrictions or harassment by the State.
3. The freedom to move for personal, professional, or recreational purposes.

It ensures national integration by allowing citizens to interact freely and participate in the social and economic life of the country.

3.2 Scope and Judicial Interpretation

The Supreme Court has held that freedom of movement is a part of personal liberty protected under Article 21 as well.

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Court expanded the meaning of “personal liberty” to include the right to travel both within and outside India.

Thus, Article 19(1)(d) and Article 21 together guarantee that restrictions on movement must be reasonable, fair, and non-arbitrary.

4. Reasonable Restrictions on Freedom of Movement

4.1 Constitutional Basis

Article 19(5) provides that:

“Nothing in sub-clauses (d) and (e) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.”

Thus, restrictions must satisfy two essential conditions:

1. They must be reasonable.
2. They must be in the interest of the general public or for protecting Scheduled Tribes.

4.2 Judicial Tests for Reasonableness

The test of reasonableness requires that:

1. The restriction must not be arbitrary or excessive.
2. There must be a rational connection between the restriction and the objective sought.
3. The restriction should be proportionate to the need for public interest or security.

In State of Madras v. V.G. Row (1952), the Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of restrictions must be judged by examining the nature of the right, the purpose of the restriction, and the proportionality of the limitation imposed.

4.3 Case Law Illustrations

(a) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushalya (1964)

Facts:

The petitioner, a prostitute, challenged an order restricting her movement within certain areas under the U.P. Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act.

Issue:

Whether the restriction on her movement violated Article 19(1)(d).

Rule:

Reasonable restrictions in the interest of public health, morality, or safety are valid under Article 19(5).

Application:

The Court upheld the restriction as it was necessary for public morality and social welfare.

Conclusion:

The case established that reasonable restrictions can extend to protect public morals and prevent social harm.

(b) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

Facts:

Maneka Gandhi’s passport was impounded by the government, preventing her from travelling abroad.

Issue:

Whether the right to travel is part of personal liberty and if its restriction must be just and fair.

Rule:

Any restriction on personal liberty, including movement, must meet the tests of fairness, justice, and reasonableness under Articles 14, 19, and 21.

Application:

The Court held that “personal liberty” includes the right to travel and that restrictions must follow due process.

Conclusion:

This case harmonized Articles 14, 19, and 21, ensuring that restrictions on movement cannot be arbitrary.

(c) Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1963)

Facts:

Police surveillance restricted the petitioner’s movements without statutory authority.

Issue:

Whether such surveillance violated Article 19(1)(d) and Article 21.

Rule:

Unlawful interference with movement constitutes a violation of personal liberty.

Application:

The Court struck down the surveillance provisions as unconstitutional.

Conclusion:

The judgment reinforced that movement is an integral part of liberty, and unwarranted restrictions violate both Articles 19 and 21.

5. Conclusion

The freedom of movement under Article 19(1)(d) is fundamental to personal liberty and national unity.

However, it is subject to reasonable restrictions that protect the general public, morality, and the interests of vulnerable groups.

The judiciary, through landmark decisions such as Kharak Singh, Kaushalya, and Maneka Gandhi, has ensured that such restrictions remain fair, proportional, and non-arbitrary.

In a democratic society, the right to move freely is both a symbol of personal autonomy and an instrument of social integration, reflecting the delicate balance between individual freedom and collective welfare. 

Judicial Interpretation of the New Doctrine of Equality — E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu

1. Introduction

Equality forms one of the basic pillars of the Indian Constitution, embodied in Articles 14, 15, and 16.

Originally, equality under Article 14 was interpreted narrowly — meaning merely “equality before law” and “equal protection of laws.”

However, in the 1970s, the Supreme Court broadened this interpretation through a dynamic, substantive, and purposive approach, marking a shift from formal equality to fairness in State action.

This transformation is best exemplified in the landmark case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974), which introduced the new doctrine of equality.

2. Constitutional Basis of Equality

2.1 Article 14 — Guarantee of Equality

Article 14 provides that:

“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”

This means that State action must be just, fair, and reasonable, and not arbitrary or discriminatory.

2.2 Traditional View (Before Royappa)

Earlier, the doctrine of equality was applied using the “reasonable classification test” laid down in cases like State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) and Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar (1955).

The two essential conditions for a valid classification were:

1. The classification must be based on intelligible differentia.
2. That differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the law.

This approach, though logical, was rigid and procedural, failing to address arbitrariness in administrative action.

3. Case Analysis: E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974)

3.1 Facts

E.P. Royappa, a member of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), was serving as the Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu.

He was transferred and made Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission, which he alleged was an arbitrary demotion violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

He claimed that the transfer was motivated by mala fide political reasons and hence violated his right to equality and equal opportunity in public employment.

3.2 Issue

Whether arbitrary or mala fide administrative action by the State violates the constitutional guarantee of equality under Articles 14 and 16.

3.3 Rule

The Supreme Court reinterpreted Article 14 to hold that:

“Equality is antithetical to arbitrariness. In fact, arbitrariness and equality are sworn enemies.”

Thus, any arbitrary action by the State is inherently violative of Article 14, even if no specific classification is involved.

3.4 Application

1. The Court held that equality under Article 14 is not confined to formal equality or reasonable classification but extends to the absence of arbitrariness in State action.
2. It declared that arbitrariness itself is discrimination, for it denies equal protection of the law.
3. The government’s decision to transfer Royappa was found to be within its administrative discretion, but the Court laid down a broader principle applicable to all State actions.

3.5 Conclusion

The Court introduced the “New Doctrine of Equality”, holding that any arbitrary, unreasonable, or mala fide State action violates Article 14.

This doctrine moved Indian constitutional law from a classificatory approach to a substantive approach, linking equality with fairness and due process.

4. Subsequent Judicial Developments

1. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) — The Court extended the Royappa doctrine, holding that Article 14’s principle of non-arbitrariness applies to all State actions, especially those affecting personal liberty under Article 21.
2. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (1981) — The Court reaffirmed that arbitrariness in administrative or contractual decisions of State bodies violates Article 14.
3. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) — The equality principle was expanded to include substantive equality through affirmative action for backward classes.

These cases together consolidated the new concept of equality as fairness and reasonableness, transforming Article 14 into a powerful weapon against arbitrary governance.

5. Conclusion

The decision in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu revolutionized the interpretation of equality in Indian constitutional law.

It shifted focus from the traditional doctrine of classification to the doctrine of non-arbitrariness, thereby humanizing administrative law.

Equality under Article 14 now means fairness, justice, and reasonableness in every sphere of State activity.

This dynamic interpretation forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution, ensuring that all organs of the State act within the boundaries of constitutional morality and justice. 

Definition of “State” under the Indian Constitution and Judicial Interpretation of “Other Authorities”

1. Introduction

The framers of the Indian Constitution realized that the guarantee of Fundamental Rights would be meaningless unless these rights could be enforced against all organs performing public functions.

Therefore, Article 12 of the Constitution provides a comprehensive definition of the term “State” for the purpose of Part III (Fundamental Rights).

It ensures that not only the traditional organs of government but also bodies exercising public powers are accountable for violations of Fundamental Rights.

2. Constitutional Definition of “State”

2.1 Text of Article 12

“The State includes the Government and Parliament of India, the Government and the Legislature of each State, and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”

2.2 Scope of Article 12

1. Government and Parliament of India – Includes the Executive and Legislature at the Union level.
2. Government and Legislature of each State – Covers the Executive and Legislature at the State level.
3. Local Authorities – Encompasses bodies like Municipalities, Panchayats, and District Boards performing governmental duties.
4. Other Authorities – A residuary category that has been interpreted expansively by the judiciary to include statutory corporations, government companies, universities, and even private bodies discharging public functions.

3. Judicial Interpretation of “Other Authorities”

3.1 University of Madras v. Shanta Bai (1954)

Facts:

A petition was filed against the University of Madras for alleged violation of Fundamental Rights.

Issue:

Whether the University, created by statute, falls within the meaning of “State” under Article 12.

Rule:

The term “other authorities” covers bodies created by law and exercising governmental powers.

Application:

The Court applied the ejusdem generis principle, holding that “other authorities” must be of the same nature as government or local authorities.

Conclusion:

The University was considered an “authority” since it was established by statute and performed public functions.

3.2 Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (1967)

Facts:

The Rajasthan Electricity Board, constituted under a statute, dismissed an employee who challenged the action under Article 14.

Issue:

Whether the Electricity Board was “State” under Article 12.

Rule:

Any body created by statute and vested with power to issue directions having the force of law is “State.”

Application:

The Board, being a statutory body with regulatory and enforcement powers, satisfied this test.

Conclusion:

The Court held that the Board was “State,” marking a shift toward a broader, functional interpretation.

3.3 Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (1975)

Facts:

Employees of ONGC, LIC, and IFC sought protection of service conditions under Fundamental Rights.

Issue:

Whether these statutory corporations were “State.”

Rule:

Corporations created by statute and performing public duties are instrumentalities of the State.

Application:

All three bodies were found to be state-controlled and performing public functions of national importance.

Conclusion:

The Court held that they were “State” within Article 12.

3.4 Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979)

Facts:

A bidder challenged arbitrary denial of a contract by the International Airport Authority.

Issue:

Whether the Authority was “State” and thus bound by Article 14.

Rule:

A body is “State” if it is financially, functionally, or administratively dominated by the government.

Application:

The Authority was established by statute, owned and controlled by the Union Government, and performed public duties.

Conclusion:

It was held to be “State,” and its actions were subject to judicial review for fairness and equality.

3.5 Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (1981)

Facts:

A society running a government-funded engineering college was alleged to have violated Article 14 in admissions.

Issue:

Whether such a society could be treated as “State.”

Rule:

The Court laid down the instrumentality or agency test: if the government has deep and pervasive control, the body is “State.”

Application:

The society was wholly financed and controlled by the government and performed a public educational function.

Conclusion:

It was held to be “State” under Article 12. This case remains the leading authority on the functional test of “State.”

4. Tests Evolved by the Supreme Court

1. Ownership Test – Whether the government owns the entire share capital.
2. Control Test – Whether there is deep and pervasive government control.
3. Functional Test – Whether the functions are of public importance closely related to governmental duties.
4. Financial Assistance Test – Whether the body is substantially financed by the government.
5. Agency or Instrumentality Test – Whether the body acts as an agent of the government in performing its tasks.

If these conditions are satisfied, the body will be regarded as “State,” and its actions will be subject to Fundamental Rights scrutiny.

5. Conclusion

The expression “State” under Article 12 has been interpreted liberally to ensure that the guarantee of Fundamental Rights is effective.

Through decisions such as Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Ramana Shetty, and Ajay Hasia, the Supreme Court expanded the definition to include statutory corporations, government companies, and even bodies performing public functions.

This dynamic interpretation ensures that any authority wielding public power is accountable to constitutional norms of equality, fairness, and justice.

Thus, Article 12 acts as the gateway provision for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights in India’s constitutional democracy. 

Significance of Fundamental Rights and Relationship between Fundamental Rights and Human Rights

1. Introduction

The Fundamental Rights in Part III (Articles 12–35) of the Indian Constitution form the foundation of Indian democracy.

They guarantee liberty, equality, and justice, ensuring that individuals are protected from arbitrary actions of the State.

These rights are inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948, and aim to uphold the dignity and worth of every individual.

Thus, Fundamental Rights represent the constitutional realization of Human Rights, making moral ideals legally enforceable.

2. Significance of Fundamental Rights

2.1 Protection of Individual Liberty

Fundamental Rights serve as a safeguard against executive and legislative tyranny.
Article 21 — the Right to Life and Personal Liberty — has been interpreted broadly to include rights to dignity, privacy, health, and education.

2.2 Promotion of Equality

Articles 14 to 18 embody the principle of equality before law and equal protection of laws.

These provisions abolish untouchability and hereditary privileges, ensuring both social and legal equality.

2.3 Strengthening of Democracy

Articles 19 to 22 guarantee freedoms essential for democracy, such as speech, association, movement, and protection from arbitrary detention.

These freedoms ensure meaningful participation of citizens in governance and public life.

2.4 Limitation on State Power

Fundamental Rights restrict governmental authority and make it accountable to the Constitution.

They ensure that the Rule of Law prevails and no organ of the State exceeds its powers.

2.5 Judicial Enforcement

Article 32 gives individuals the right to directly approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar called it the “heart and soul of the Constitution”, emphasizing its vital role in protecting liberty.

3. Relationship between Fundamental Rights and Human Rights

3.1 Conceptual Link

Human Rights are inherent and universal, belonging to every human being.

Fundamental Rights are those same rights given legal recognition and constitutional protection within India.

Hence, while Human Rights are moral and natural, Fundamental Rights are legal and enforceable.

3.2 Judicial Interpretation (FIRAC)

(a) Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

Facts:

The petitioner challenged constitutional amendments that curtailed Fundamental Rights related to property.

Issue:

Whether Parliament had unlimited power to amend the Constitution.

Rule:

Amendments cannot alter the basic structure of the Constitution.

Application:

The Court held that Fundamental Rights, embodying human dignity and liberty, form part of the basic structure.

Conclusion:

Fundamental Rights are permanent guarantees of human dignity and justice within the constitutional framework.

(b) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

Facts:

The petitioner’s passport was seized without being given a fair hearing.

Issue:

Whether “procedure established by law” under Article 21 must be fair and reasonable.

Rule:

The procedure must be just, fair, and reasonable, not arbitrary.

Application:

The Court expanded Article 21 to include the right to live with dignity, aligning it with human rights principles.

Conclusion:

The judgment made human dignity and fair process integral to the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty.

(c) Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997)

Facts:

Public interest litigation was filed after a case of workplace sexual harassment, with no existing domestic law.

Issue:

Can international human rights conventions be used to interpret Fundamental Rights?

Rule:

The Court can rely on international conventions consistent with Fundamental Rights.

Application:

The Court used the CEDAW Convention and Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 to frame the Vishaka Guidelines for women’s safety.

Conclusion:

The case affirmed that Fundamental Rights and Human Rights are complementary and mutually reinforcing.

4. Integration of Fundamental Rights and Human Rights

Right to Equality (Articles 14–18) corresponds to Article 7 of the UDHR.
Right to Freedom (Articles 19–22) reflects Articles 19–21 of the UDHR.
Right against Exploitation (Articles 23–24) mirrors Article 4 of the UDHR.
Right to Religion (Articles 25–28) parallels Articles 18–19 of the UDHR.
Cultural and Educational Rights (Articles 29–30) align with Article 26 of the UDHR.

5. Conclusion

Fundamental Rights are the legal embodiment of Human Rights, securing dignity, liberty, and equality for all citizens.

They transform universal human ideals into binding constitutional obligations.

Through progressive judicial interpretation, Indian courts have harmonized Fundamental Rights with international human rights norms.

Together, they form the moral and legal foundation of India’s democratic and constitutional order. 

1. Importance of the Constituent Assembly in Framing of the Indian Constitution

1.1 Introduction

The Constituent Assembly of India was the representative body responsible for drafting and adopting the Constitution of India. It was the foundation upon which independent India’s democratic structure was built. The Assembly was not merely a drafting committee — it was a miniature parliament, reflecting India’s diversity, political vision, and socio-economic aspirations.

The Constitution it produced became the supreme law of the land, guaranteeing fundamental rights, establishing organs of governance, and outlining the ideals of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity.

1.2 Composition of the Constituent Assembly

1. The Assembly was formed under the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946.
2. It comprised 389 members — 292 from British Indian provinces, 93 from princely states, and 4 from chief commissioner’s provinces.
3. After the partition of India in 1947, the membership was reduced to 299.
4. Dr. Rajendra Prasad was elected as the President of the Assembly, while Dr. B.R. Ambedkar chaired the Drafting Committee.

The Assembly first met on 9th December 1946, and the Constitution was finally adopted on 26th November 1949.

1.3 Objectives and Tasks of the Constituent Assembly

The Assembly’s primary task was to draft a Constitution that would:

1. Ensure political, social, and economic democracy.
2. Uphold the ideals of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity.
3. Establish a republican form of government based on parliamentary democracy.
4. Protect the rights and dignity of individuals and minorities.
5. Create a framework for federal governance with strong unity.

1.4 Major Committees of the Assembly

To efficiently prepare the Constitution, the Assembly appointed several committees:

• Drafting Committee – chaired by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (responsible for the final draft).
• Union Powers Committee – chaired by Jawaharlal Nehru.
• Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee – chaired by J.B. Kripalani.
• Advisory Committee on Minorities – chaired by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.
• Union Constitution Committee – also chaired by Jawaharlal Nehru.

These committees debated and resolved crucial issues related to citizenship, rights, federalism, and governance.

1.5 Role and Achievements of the Constituent Assembly

1.5.1 Guardian of Indian Democracy

The Assembly laid the foundation of parliamentary democracy, guaranteeing universal adult franchise, periodic elections, and independent judiciary.

1.5.2 Protector of Fundamental Rights

It included Fundamental Rights (Part III) to ensure protection of individual liberties against State action.

1.5.3 Framework for Welfare State

By including the Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV), it ensured that the State would strive toward social and economic justice.

1.5.4 Federal Structure with a Unitary Bias

It adopted a federal system with a strong centre, keeping in mind India’s diversity and need for national unity.

1.5.5 Inclusion of Judicial Review

Inspired by American constitutional principles, the Assembly introduced judicial review under Articles 13, 32, and 226, making the judiciary the guardian of the Constitution.

1.6 Democratic Spirit of the Constituent Assembly

• All decisions were taken after intense debates and consensus, not majoritarian imposition.
• Over 2,000 amendments were discussed, reflecting the spirit of inclusiveness and deliberation.
• The debates were open, recorded, and transparent, showcasing India’s early democratic culture.

1.7 Duration and Cost

• The Assembly worked for 2 years, 11 months, and 18 days, holding 11 sessions over 165 days of actual sittings.
• The total cost was about ₹64 lakh, a modest sum for laying down the foundation of the world’s largest democracy.

1.8 Significance

1. Democratic Representation: Reflected the collective will of the Indian people.
2. Blend of Ideals: Combined features of British parliamentary democracy, American federalism, and Indian socio-cultural ethos.
3. Blueprint for Governance: Created a Constitution that continues to guide India’s democratic journey.
4. Legacy of Visionaries: Leaders like Ambedkar, Nehru, Patel, Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar, and K.M. Munshi shaped a Constitution both rigid and flexible.

1.9 Conclusion

The Constituent Assembly was the architect of modern India. Its vision transformed colonial India into a sovereign democratic republic. By blending liberal democratic values with social welfare ideals, it produced a living document capable of adaptation and growth.

As Justice H.R. Khanna later remarked,

“The Constitution is not a gift from the British; it is the solemn resolve of the people of India through their Constituent Assembly.”

The Assembly thus remains the foundation stone of India’s constitutional democracy. 

Protection Against Double Jeopardy under the Indian Constitution

1. Introduction

• The principle of double jeopardy is a fundamental safeguard in criminal jurisprudence that ensures no person is prosecuted or punished twice for the same offence.
• It embodies the maxim “Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa” — meaning no one should be vexed twice for the same cause.
• In India, this protection is enshrined under Article 20(2) of the Constitution and reinforced by Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).

2. Constitutional Provision – Article 20(2)

“No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.”

Key Features:

1. It applies only to criminal proceedings and not to civil or departmental actions.
2. It protects only against double punishment, not against a second trial unless the first trial resulted in conviction or acquittal.
3. The earlier proceeding must have been before a court of competent jurisdiction.

3. Objective and Rationale

• To protect individuals from harassment, hardship, and oppression through repeated trials for the same offence.
• To uphold fairness in criminal justice and prevent abuse of power by the State.
• To ensure finality of judicial decisions and maintain public confidence in the justice system.

4. FIRAC – Leading Judicial Decisions

4.1 Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay (1953)

Facts:

The appellant, upon arrival in India, failed to declare gold at customs. The gold was confiscated by customs authorities. Later, he was prosecuted under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) for the same act.

Issue:

Whether confiscation by customs authorities amounted to prosecution and punishment, thus attracting Article 20(2).

Rule:

Article 20(2) applies only when a person has been prosecuted and punished by a judicial tribunal for the same offence.

Application:

The Court held that the customs proceedings were departmental, not judicial, and therefore not a “prosecution” within the meaning of Article 20(2).

Conclusion:

No violation of double jeopardy — departmental penalty and criminal prosecution can coexist if they arise under different jurisdictions.

4.2 S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India (1954)

Facts:

A government officer was dismissed from service after departmental inquiry for corruption. He was later prosecuted criminally for the same act.

Issue:

Whether departmental dismissal followed by criminal prosecution amounts to double jeopardy.

Rule:

Article 20(2) applies only to cases of judicial prosecution and punishment, not to departmental proceedings.

Application:

Since the departmental inquiry was not a criminal trial, Article 20(2) was not violated.

Conclusion:

The principle of double jeopardy does not bar both departmental and criminal proceedings for the same misconduct.

4.3 Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao (2011)

Facts:

The accused was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (cheque bounce) and later charged under Section 420 IPC (cheating) for the same transaction.

Issue:

Whether a second prosecution under IPC violated Article 20(2).

Rule:

If the ingredients of both offences are identical, the second prosecution is barred by the principle of double jeopardy.

Application:

The Court held that both charges arose from the same set of facts and constituted the same offence in substance.

Conclusion:

The second prosecution was barred — reaffirming that no person can be punished twice for the same offence when the ingredients overlap.

5. Statutory Recognition – Section 300 of CrPC, 1973

Section 300 CrPC complements Article 20(2) by providing that:

• A person once convicted or acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence;
• Exception: if the higher court sets aside the conviction or orders retrial.

Thus, it ensures consistency between constitutional and procedural safeguards.

6. Limitations of the Protection

1. It applies only when the first prosecution results in conviction or acquittal.
2. It does not bar parallel departmental proceedings.
3. It does not apply if the subsequent offence is distinct in facts or ingredients.
4. It does not prevent retrial ordered by a competent appellate or revisional court.

7. Conclusion

The protection against double jeopardy under Article 20(2) upholds the principles of justice, certainty, and fairness in criminal law. It ensures that once a person has been lawfully tried and punished (or acquitted), the State cannot reopen the same matter to inflict further punishment.

Judicial interpretation — from Maqbool Hussain to Kolla Veera Raghav Rao — reflects a balanced approach between protecting individual rights and enabling effective administration of justice.

Thus, Article 20(2) forms an essential part of the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and rule of law in India. 

Judicial Review under the Indian Constitution

1. Introduction

• Judicial Review is the power of the judiciary to examine the constitutionality of legislative enactments and executive actions of the government.
• It ensures that all organs of the State act within their constitutional limits and uphold the Rule of Law.
• The doctrine of judicial review forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be abrogated even by constitutional amendment.

2. Constitutional Basis

Judicial review in India derives from several provisions of the Constitution:

1. Article 13 — Declares that any law inconsistent with Fundamental Rights is void.
2. Article 32 — Empowers the Supreme Court to enforce Fundamental Rights.
3. Article 226 — Empowers High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of Fundamental and legal rights.
4. Article 245 & 246 — Define the limits of legislative power, allowing courts to review laws beyond legislative competence.
5. Article 368 — Subject to judicial review to ensure constitutional amendments do not violate the basic structure.

3. Objectives of Judicial Review

• To maintain supremacy of the Constitution.
• To protect Fundamental Rights of citizens.
• To ensure separation of powers among the legislature, executive, and judiciary.
• To uphold Rule of Law and prevent arbitrary action.

4. Scope of Judicial Review

Judicial review operates in three broad areas:

1. Legislative Actions — Checking whether laws violate the Constitution.
2. Executive Actions — Reviewing administrative decisions for arbitrariness or mala fides.
3. Judicial Decisions — Through appellate or supervisory jurisdiction.

5. Landmark Cases (FIRAC Analysis)

5.1 A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)

Facts:

A.K. Gopalan, a communist leader, was detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and challenged it as violative of Articles 19 and 21.

Issue:

Whether the Act and the detention violated the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Rule:

Article 21 requires deprivation of liberty only by “procedure established by law.”

Application:

The Supreme Court upheld the detention, interpreting Article 21 narrowly. Judicial review at this stage was limited to procedural validity.

Conclusion:

The case reflected an early restrictive approach to judicial review of personal liberty, later overruled by Maneka Gandhi.

5.2 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

Facts:

The validity of constitutional amendments curtailing Fundamental Rights was challenged.

Issue:

Whether Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is unlimited.

Rule:

Parliament cannot alter or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.

Application:

The Court upheld Parliament’s power to amend but held that judicial review, Fundamental Rights, and rule of law are part of the basic structure.

Conclusion:

Judicial review was recognized as a permanent feature of the Constitution, beyond Parliament’s reach.

5.3 Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)

Facts:

The validity of the 42nd Amendment was challenged, which had given primacy to Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights.

Issue:

Whether the amendment destroyed the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.

Rule:

The basic structure doctrine limits Parliament’s amending power.

Application:

The Supreme Court struck down sections of the amendment that curtailed judicial review.

Conclusion:

The Court reaffirmed that judicial review is part of the basic structure and cannot be abrogated by constitutional amendment.

6. Types of Judicial Review

1. Constitutional Review: Ensures laws comply with the Constitution.
2. Administrative Review: Ensures administrative discretion is exercised fairly and reasonably.
3. Judicial Review of Amendments: Ensures Parliament’s amending power does not violate the basic structure (as per Kesavananda Bharati).

7. Limitations of Judicial Review

• The judiciary cannot act as a super-legislature.
• Courts interfere only when there is a clear constitutional or legal violation.
• Political questions or policy decisions are generally beyond judicial scrutiny.
• Judicial review operates on the principle of judicial restraint to respect separation of powers.

8. Conclusion

Judicial review is the guardian mechanism of the Constitution, ensuring that the legislature and executive act within constitutional limits. It upholds the supremacy of law, protects individual liberties, and preserves democratic values.

Through landmark decisions such as Kesavananda Bharati and Minerva Mills, the Supreme Court established that judicial review is part of the basic structure, making it indispensable to India’s constitutional framework.

Hence, judicial review represents the living conscience of the Constitution — guaranteeing justice, liberty, and equality for all. 

Right of Citizenship under the Constitution of India

1. Introduction

The Constitution of India provides for the acquisition and termination of Indian citizenship under Part II (Articles 5 to 11). Citizenship determines the legal status of individuals as members of the Indian State and grants them full civil and political rights, such as the right to vote, hold public office, and enjoy Fundamental Rights restricted to citizens.

2. Citizenship at the Commencement of the Constitution

Articles 5 to 8 specify who became Indian citizens on 26 January 1950, the day the Constitution came into force.

1. Article 5 – Citizenship by Domicile:

   Every person domiciled in India and either born in India, or with a parent born in India, or ordinarily resident for at least five years before 26 January 1950, became a citizen.

2. Article 6 – Citizenship of Migrants from Pakistan:

   Persons migrating from Pakistan to India before 19 July 1948 automatically became citizens if they had been ordinarily resident in India; those who migrated after this date needed registration.

3. Article 7 – Citizenship of Migrants to Pakistan:

   Persons who migrated to Pakistan but later returned to India could become citizens only if they obtained resettlement permits.

4. Article 8 – Citizenship of Indians Abroad:

   Persons of Indian origin residing outside India became citizens if registered by Indian diplomatic or consular officers.

3. Parliament’s Power to Regulate Citizenship

Article 11 empowers Parliament to make laws regarding acquisition and termination of citizenship.

Accordingly, Parliament enacted the Citizenship Act, 1955, which provides for citizenship:

• by birth,
• by descent,
• by registration,
• by naturalization, and
• by incorporation of territory.

It also provides for termination (renunciation, termination, deprivation) of citizenship.

4. Amendments and Recent Developments

The Citizenship Act has been amended several times, notably by the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, which provides Indian citizenship to certain persecuted minorities from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan.

The question of citizenship has also gained significance in connection with the NRC (National Register of Citizens) and issues of illegal migration.

5. Conclusion

The provisions on citizenship under the Constitution establish the foundational identity of Indians as members of a unified nation. While the Constitution laid down the initial framework, the Citizenship Act, 1955 governs ongoing matters of acquisition and loss. The right of citizenship thus ensures national unity, defines civic belonging, and balances humanitarian and constitutional considerations in a diverse democratic republic. 

Preamble of the Indian Constitution

1. Introduction

The Preamble is the introductory statement to the Constitution of India. It reflects the philosophy, values, and objectives upon which the entire Constitution is based. It acts as a guiding light for interpreting the Constitution and expresses the aspirations of the people of India.

2. Text and Source

The Preamble reads:

“We, the People of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic, Republic and to secure to all its citizens:
Justice, social, economic and political;
Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
Equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all
Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;

In our Constituent Assembly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.”

The words Socialist, Secular, and Integrity were added by the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976.

3. Nature and Importance

• The Preamble is not enforceable by courts, yet it is an integral part of the Constitution.
• It declares the source of authority — “We, the People of India” — emphasizing that sovereignty rests with the people.
• It lays down the goals of the Constitution, namely justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity.
• It reflects the vision of the framers and serves as a key to interpret ambiguous provisions of the Constitution.

4. Judicial Interpretation

Berubari Union Case (1960)

The Supreme Court initially held that the Preamble is not a part of the Constitution and cannot confer powers or restrictions.

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

The Court overruled the earlier view and held that the Preamble is part of the Constitution and embodies its basic structure. It can be used to interpret constitutional provisions and amendments.

LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre (1995)

The Court reaffirmed that the Preamble reflects the constitutional philosophy and must guide interpretation toward achieving socio-economic justice.

5. Conclusion

The Preamble is the spirit and soul of the Indian Constitution. It embodies the ideals of democracy, secularism, and social justice and reflects the transformative character of the Indian State. Though non-justiciable, it remains the beacon light guiding constitutional interpretation and governance in India. 

WRIT JURISDICTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

1. Introduction

The framers of the Indian Constitution ensured that the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III (Articles 12–35) are not merely declaratory but enforceable. To secure this, the Constitution confers power upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 and the High Courts under Article 226 to issue writs for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

This power is called “writ jurisdiction”, and it constitutes the cornerstone of the rule of law in India. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar described Article 32 as the “heart and soul of the Constitution”, as it provides citizens a direct and effective remedy against the violation of Fundamental Rights.

2. Meaning of Writ Jurisdiction

The term “writ” originates from English common law, meaning a formal written order issued by a court commanding the performance or restraint of an act.

In the Indian context, writ jurisdiction refers to the constitutional authority of superior courts (Supreme Court and High Courts) to issue writs for the protection of legal and fundamental rights of individuals.

3. Constitutional Provisions

3.1 Article 32 – Supreme Court’s Writ Jurisdiction

• Article 32(1) guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court directly for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
• Article 32(2) empowers the Supreme Court to issue directions, orders, or writs — including the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari.
• It is itself a Fundamental Right available to citizens and non-citizens alike (except in cases where the right itself is confined to citizens).

3.2 Article 226 – High Courts’ Writ Jurisdiction

• Article 226 empowers every High Court to issue writs for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights as well as for any other purpose (including legal rights).
• Thus, the writ jurisdiction of High Courts is wider than that of the Supreme Court, as it extends to legal as well as fundamental rights.

4. Nature and Importance of Constitutional Remedies

The right to constitutional remedies ensures that Fundamental Rights are not theoretical but practical. It acts as a guarantee of rights and a check on arbitrary State action.

In Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras (1950), the Supreme Court emphasized that the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights is itself a Fundamental Right, ensuring that individual liberties are not at the mercy of executive discretion.

5. Types of Writs under Articles 32 and 226

The Indian Constitution recognizes five types of writs. Each has a distinct purpose and scope.

5.1 Writ of Habeas Corpus — “You may have the body”

Purpose:

To secure the release of a person unlawfully detained or imprisoned.

FIRAC Example: A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976)

Facts:

During the Emergency of 1975, habeas corpus petitions were filed challenging illegal detentions.

Issue:

Whether the right to personal liberty could be suspended during an Emergency.

Rule:

Under Article 21, no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

Application:

The Supreme Court (by majority) held that during the Emergency, the right to move the court for enforcement of Article 21 stood suspended.

Conclusion:

This decision was heavily criticized and later overruled in subsequent cases, reinforcing that habeas corpus remains the most powerful safeguard of liberty.

5.2 Writ of Mandamus — “We command”

Purpose:

To command a public authority, tribunal, or government body to perform a public duty imposed by law.

Applicable when:

A public authority refuses to act or performs its duty negligently.

Case: Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual (1969)

The Supreme Court held that mandamus can be issued only to enforce the performance of public duties and not against private individuals.

5.3 Writ of Prohibition — “To forbid”

Purpose:

Issued by a superior court to a lower court or tribunal to prevent it from exceeding its jurisdiction or acting contrary to the rules of natural justice.

Case: East India Commercial Co. v. Collector of Customs (1962)

The Court held that prohibition lies to prevent a judicial or quasi-judicial authority from acting beyond its powers.

5.4 Writ of Certiorari — “To be certified”

Purpose:

Issued by a superior court to quash an order or decision of a lower court, tribunal, or public authority made without jurisdiction, in violation of natural justice, or due to an error apparent on the face of the record.

Case: Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas Advani (1950)

The Supreme Court clarified that certiorari is available to correct jurisdictional errors and ensure that justice is not miscarried.

5.5 Writ of Quo Warranto — “By what authority”

Purpose:

Issued to inquire into the legality of a person’s claim to hold a public office. It prevents usurpation of public offices by unauthorized persons.

Case: University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao (1963)

The Court held that quo warranto can be issued when a public office is held by a person without fulfilling statutory qualifications.

6. Comparative Scope of Articles 32 and 226

1. Article 32:

• Can be invoked only for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
• The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is original but not discretionary — it is a guaranteed right.

2. Article 226:

• Can be invoked for the enforcement of both Fundamental and legal rights.
• The High Court’s jurisdiction is wider but discretionary, and it may refuse relief if an alternative remedy exists.

Thus, while both Articles uphold constitutional remedies, Article 32 ensures the protection of fundamental rights, and Article 226 ensures broader administrative justice.

7. Judicial Activism and Expansion of Writ Jurisdiction

Through Public Interest Litigation (PIL), the courts have expanded writ jurisdiction to protect collective rights and access to justice for the poor and marginalized.

Case: S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981)

The Court held that even a person not personally aggrieved may file a petition under Article 32 or 226 to redress public wrongs or violations of constitutional rights.

8. Limitations on Writ Jurisdiction

• Writs cannot generally be issued against private individuals (except when performing public duties).
• The court may decline relief if the petitioner has an alternative adequate remedy.
• Writ jurisdiction cannot be used for purely contractual or political matters.
• The exercise of writ jurisdiction is discretionary and guided by principles of equity and justice.

9. Conclusion

The writ jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 embodies the constitutional guarantee of justice and liberty. It ensures that no violation of Fundamental Rights goes unchecked and that public authorities act within their lawful limits.

Through judicial creativity, especially in the era of PILs, the Indian judiciary has expanded the reach of writ jurisdiction to include socio-economic rights and environmental protection.

Thus, writ jurisdiction represents the living spirit of constitutionalism — ensuring that rights are protected, power is limited, and justice is made accessible to every citizen. 

WELFARE STATE, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY

1. Introduction

The Constitution of India aspires to establish India as a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic, and Republic nation. The term Socialist in the Preamble reflects the commitment of the State to promote social and economic justice and to eliminate inequalities.

To achieve this vision, the Constitution includes a special set of provisions known as the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs) under Part IV (Articles 36 to 51). These principles guide the State in governance to ensure that political democracy is supplemented by social and economic democracy, thereby creating a true welfare state.

2. Concept of Welfare State

A welfare state is one in which the government plays an active role in ensuring the welfare of its citizens through social and economic reforms. It focuses on promoting equality, removing poverty, and securing a dignified standard of life for all individuals.

In a welfare state, the State’s role extends beyond maintaining law and order — it must secure education, employment, health, and social security.

The Indian Constitution, by incorporating DPSPs, envisages India not merely as a political democracy but as a social welfare state aimed at establishing a just social order based on equality and human dignity.

3. Concept of Social Justice

Social justice means the fair and equitable distribution of wealth, opportunities, and privileges within society. It ensures the removal of economic and social disparities and protects the interests of weaker and marginalized sections.

The Supreme Court has defined social justice as the balancing of interests of all sections of society to achieve equality of status and opportunity as envisaged in the Preamble.

Social justice, therefore, acts as the foundation of a welfare state and the guiding spirit of the Directive Principles.

4. Directive Principles of State Policy — Meaning and Nature

The Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs), contained in Articles 36 to 51, are constitutional instructions to the State. Article 37 declares that while these principles are non-justiciable (not enforceable in a court of law), they are nevertheless fundamental to the governance of the country, and it is the duty of the State to apply them in making laws.

They represent the social and economic philosophy of the Constitution and aim to transform the ideals of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity into concrete socio-economic programs.

5. Objectives and Significance of DPSPs

The DPSPs serve several key purposes:

1. They aim to achieve economic democracy by ensuring equitable distribution of resources.
2. They guide the State in framing welfare-oriented policies for citizens’ well-being.
3. They bridge the gap between Fundamental Rights and socio-economic rights, ensuring both coexist harmoniously.
4. They express the constitutional goal of social justice, protecting weaker sections and promoting public welfare.
5. They provide a yardstick to evaluate the performance of the government in implementing constitutional ideals.

6. Examples of Important Directive Principles

• Article 38: Directs the State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people.
• Article 39: Ensures that citizens have adequate livelihood, equal pay for equal work, and that wealth is not concentrated in a few hands.
• Article 41: Ensures the right to work, education, and public assistance.
• Article 42: Provides for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief.
• Article 43: Ensures living wages and decent conditions of work for all workers.
• Article 45: Promotes early childhood care and education.
• Article 47: Imposes a duty on the State to raise the level of nutrition and standard of living and to improve public health.

These principles collectively promote the ideals of a welfare state and social justice.

7. Relationship Between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs

Originally, Fundamental Rights (Part III) were considered justiciable and enforceable, while DPSPs were non-justiciable. This created tension between the two parts when social welfare legislation enacted under DPSPs appeared to violate individual rights. Over time, judicial interpretation has harmonized the two, holding that Fundamental Rights and DPSPs are complementary rather than conflicting.

The courts have emphasized that Fundamental Rights ensure individual liberty, whereas DPSPs ensure social and economic justice — together constituting the foundation of a democratic welfare state.

8. Judicial Interpretation and Landmark Cases

8.1 State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)

Facts:

The State of Madras implemented communal reservations in educational institutions based on caste and religion.

Issue:

Whether such reservation violated Fundamental Rights under Article 29(2).

Rule:

Fundamental Rights are enforceable, while DPSPs are non-enforceable. In case of conflict, Fundamental Rights prevail.

Application:

The Supreme Court struck down the reservation policy, holding that DPSPs cannot override Fundamental Rights.

Conclusion:

This case led to the First Constitutional Amendment (1951), inserting Article 15(4) to harmonize Fundamental Rights with DPSPs.

8.2 Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)

Facts:

Certain land reform laws enacted under DPSPs were challenged for violating the right to property.

Issue:

Whether Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights to implement DPSPs.

Rule:

The Supreme Court held that Parliament cannot amend Fundamental Rights, treating them as inviolable.

Conclusion:

This decision temporarily subordinated DPSPs to Fundamental Rights, leading to later constitutional changes.

8.3 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

Facts:

The validity of constitutional amendments affecting Fundamental Rights was challenged.

Issue:

Whether Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 was unlimited.

Rule:

Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, but it cannot alter its basic structure.

Application:

The Court held that harmony between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

Conclusion:

This judgment balanced individual rights and collective welfare, establishing the supremacy of constitutional harmony.

8.4 Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)

Facts:

The 42nd Amendment had expanded Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution and gave precedence to DPSPs over Fundamental Rights.

Issue:

Whether giving absolute primacy to DPSPs over Fundamental Rights was constitutional.

Rule:

The Constitution is founded on the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.

Application:

The Supreme Court struck down the amendment, stating that the harmony and balance between Parts III and IV constitute the basic structure of the Constitution.

Conclusion:

The Court reaffirmed that DPSPs are fundamental to governance, but they cannot destroy Fundamental Rights. Both must coexist and complement each other to achieve the goal of a welfare state.

9. Non-Justiciability of Directive Principles

Article 37 explicitly states that the DPSPs are not enforceable by any court. This means that individuals cannot claim their implementation as a legal right. However, their non-justiciability does not mean irrelevance. The State is morally and constitutionally bound to apply these principles in governance.

The judiciary has also used DPSPs to interpret Fundamental Rights broadly — for instance, reading the right to education (Article 45) into Article 21 in Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993), which later resulted in Article 21-A through the 86th Amendment.

10. Significance of DPSPs in a Welfare State

1. They serve as a moral compass guiding legislative and executive policies.
2. They embody the constitutional philosophy of social and economic democracy.
3. They ensure continuity of governance policies despite political changes.
4. They have inspired land reform, labour welfare, environmental, and educational laws.
5. They promote inclusive growth, empowering weaker sections, women, and children.

Thus, even though they are non-justiciable, DPSPs possess constitutional sanctity and have become the blueprint for India’s welfare state.

11. Conclusion

The Directive Principles of State Policy reflect the transformative vision of the Indian Constitution. They transform the Preamble’s ideals into actionable objectives and serve as the soul of the welfare state.

While they are non-justiciable, the courts and Parliament have worked together to give them practical effect through judicial interpretation and legislative action. The harmony between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs represents the Constitution’s balance between liberty and equality, ensuring that India evolves as a true social welfare state committed to justice, dignity, and equality for all. 

SENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES TEST AND TRIPLE TALAQ

1. Introduction

The Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26, which ensure every individual’s right to profess, practice, and propagate religion. However, these rights are not absolute. They are subject to public order, morality, health, and other provisions of Part III, including the right to equality and life.

To balance religious freedom with constitutional values, the Supreme Court evolved the doctrine of “Essential Religious Practices” — a judicial test used to determine which practices are integral to a religion and thereby protected under Article 25.

2. The Essential Religious Practices Test — Meaning and Origin

The Essential Religious Practices Test (ERP Test) seeks to answer the question: Is a particular practice fundamental to a religion, or is it a secular or optional aspect that can be regulated by the State?

If a practice is essential to the religion — meaning its removal would alter the very nature of the religion — it is protected under Article 25. If not, it can be subjected to regulation or even prohibition.

This doctrine was first articulated in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (1954).

3. Landmark Case: The Shirur Mutt Case (1954)

Facts:

The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act empowered the State to control the administration of religious institutions. A challenge was made that the Act interfered with the right of religious denominations to manage their own affairs.

Issue:

Whether the State can interfere with religious practices under Article 25 and 26.

Rule:

The Supreme Court held that religion includes not only beliefs but also rituals, observances, ceremonies, and modes of worship that are integral to it. What constitutes an essential part of religion must be determined with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself.

Application:

The Court struck down parts of the Act that gave the government control over the management of religious affairs.

Conclusion:

This case established the Essential Religious Practices Test, stating that only those practices that are essential and integral to a religion are protected under Article 25. Non-essential or secular activities can be regulated by the State.

4. Evolution of the Test

Over time, the judiciary has applied the test in several cases to determine whether a practice is an integral part of religion.

In Durgah Committee v. Syed Hussain Ali (1961), the Court held that superstitious or extraneous practices are not protected by Article 25.

In Qureshi v. State of Bihar (1958), the Court upheld a ban on cow slaughter, observing that animal sacrifice was not an essential practice of Islam.

Thus, the ERP test became a judicial standard for distinguishing between core religious obligations and optional social practices.

5. The Triple Talaq Controversy

Background

Triple Talaq, or Talaq-e-Biddat, allowed a Muslim husband to instantly and irrevocably divorce his wife by pronouncing “talaq” three times in one sitting. This form of divorce was widely criticized for being arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of gender justice.

Constitutional Challenge

In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), several Muslim women, including Shayara Bano, challenged the validity of Triple Talaq as violative of their Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 (equality before law), 15 (non-discrimination), and 21 (right to life and dignity).

The key question before the Supreme Court was whether Triple Talaq constituted an essential religious practice protected under Article 25.

6. The Shayara Bano Case (2017) — FIRAC Analysis

Facts:

Shayara Bano was divorced by her husband through instant Triple Talaq. She challenged the practice as unconstitutional and inconsistent with gender equality and dignity. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board defended it as part of the religious freedom guaranteed under Article 25.

Issue:

Whether Talaq-e-Biddat (instant Triple Talaq) is an essential religious practice under Islam and thus protected under Article 25 of the Constitution.

Rule:

Article 25 guarantees freedom of religion, but it protects only essential and integral practices of a religion. Practices that are arbitrary, oppressive, or contrary to public order, morality, and fundamental rights are not protected.

Application:

A five-judge Constitutional Bench delivered a split verdict (3:2):

1. Justice Rohinton Nariman and Justice U.U. Lalit (majority):

   Held that Triple Talaq violates Article 14 as it is manifestly arbitrary. It lacks any rational justification and discriminates against women. Therefore, it is unconstitutional.

2. Justice Kurian Joseph (concurring):

   Held that Triple Talaq is not an essential practice of Islam. The Quran permits divorce but requires attempts at reconciliation before final separation. Instant Talaq, therefore, is contrary to the Quranic mandate and is not integral to the faith.

3. Chief Justice Khehar and Justice Abdul Nazeer (dissenting):

   Held that Triple Talaq has been practiced for centuries and forms part of personal law; hence, it is protected under Article 25. However, they suggested the Parliament enact a law regulating it.

Conclusion:

By a 3:2 majority, the Supreme Court declared Talaq-e-Biddat unconstitutional. The judgment reaffirmed that practices inconsistent with constitutional morality and fundamental rights cannot be shielded by religious freedom.

7. Legislative Response

Following the judgment, Parliament enacted The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, which criminalized instant Triple Talaq. The law gave legal recognition to the principle that religious practices cannot override fundamental rights, especially those ensuring equality and dignity for women.

8. Significance and Constitutional Implications

The decision in Shayara Bano is a milestone in constitutional jurisprudence. It demonstrates that religious freedom is subject to constitutional supremacy. The Court reaffirmed that:

• Essential religious practices must align with the spirit of the Constitution.
• Practices that are arbitrary, oppressive, or violative of equality and dignity cannot claim constitutional protection.
• The judiciary has the power to interpret what constitutes an essential practice by examining religious texts, traditions, and modern constitutional principles.

This approach illustrates the transformative character of the Indian Constitution, which harmonizes individual rights with social justice and gender equality.

9. Conclusion

The Essential Religious Practices Test is a judicial doctrine used to safeguard genuine religious freedom while ensuring that religion does not become a shield for inequality or injustice.

In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court applied this test and rightly concluded that Triple Talaq is not an essential religious practice under Islam. It was found to be arbitrary, contrary to the Quranic spirit, and violative of Articles 14 and 21.

This judgment represents a progressive step toward constitutional morality, affirming that in a secular democracy, constitutional values take precedence over religious customs when the two are in conflict.

1. Introduction

Article 21 of the Constitution of India reads:

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”

Originally, this provision was viewed narrowly, confining “life” and “personal liberty” to mere physical existence and freedom from arbitrary detention. However, through decades of judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court has transformed Article 21 into a reservoir of human rights, encompassing a wide range of social, economic, and environmental rights essential to human dignity.

This dynamic and expansive interpretation demonstrates the transformative character of the Indian Constitution — a living document capable of evolving with changing needs and values of society.

2. Early Narrow Interpretation

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)

Facts:

A communist leader, A.K. Gopalan, was detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and he challenged it as violative of Articles 19 and 21.

Issue:

Whether preventive detention under “procedure established by law” could violate personal liberty.

Rule:

The Court held that each fundamental right was distinct and unrelated. As long as the procedure was enacted by a valid law, deprivation of liberty was constitutionally valid.

Application and Conclusion:

The Court adopted a formal and restrictive interpretation of Article 21, holding that “procedure established by law” did not require fairness or reasonableness. This narrow view prevailed for nearly three decades.

3. The Turning Point — Liberal and Transformative Interpretation

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

Facts:

The petitioner’s passport was impounded by the government without providing reasons, allegedly violating her personal liberty.

Issue:

Whether the procedure under Article 21 must satisfy the requirements of fairness and reasonableness.

Rule:

The Court held that the “procedure established by law” must be just, fair, and reasonable, and not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive.

Application:

The Supreme Court integrated Articles 14, 19, and 21 into a “golden triangle”, holding that any law depriving personal liberty must satisfy equality and reasonableness tests.

Conclusion:

This case revolutionized constitutional jurisprudence, transforming Article 21 into a source of substantive due process and opening the door for the expansion of its ambit.

4. Expansion of the Right to Life and Personal Liberty

Post-Maneka Gandhi, Article 21 has been judicially expanded to include numerous rights necessary for living with human dignity.

4.1 Right to Live with Human Dignity

Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981)

The Court held that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes with it — including adequate nutrition, clothing, shelter, and facilities for expression.
Significance: Life under Article 21 means a life of quality and dignity, not mere survival.

4.2 Right to Livelihood

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985)
Facts: Pavement dwellers in Mumbai challenged their eviction.
Issue: Whether the right to livelihood is protected under Article 21.
Rule: The Court held that deprivation of livelihood amounts to deprivation of life.
Conclusion: The right to livelihood is an integral part of the right to life, as no person can live without means of subsistence.

4.3 Right to Health and Medical Care

Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India (1995)

The Supreme Court held that the right to health and medical care of workers is a fundamental right under Article 21. The State is obliged to ensure humane working conditions and occupational safety.

Similarly, in Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal (1996), the Court held that failure to provide timely medical treatment amounts to violation of Article 21.

4.4 Right to Pollution-Free Environment

Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar (1991)

The Court held that the right to life includes the right to enjoyment of pollution-free water and air.

This principle was reinforced in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case, 1987), where the Court evolved the doctrine of absolute liability for hazardous industries.

Thus, environmental protection became a constitutional right under Article 21.

4.5 Right to Privacy

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

Facts:

The constitutionality of the Aadhaar project and surveillance practices was challenged, raising the question of whether privacy is a fundamental right.

Issue:

Whether the right to privacy is part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.

Rule:

A nine-judge bench unanimously held that privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21 and forms an essential part of dignity and autonomy.

Application and Conclusion:

The judgment recognized informational privacy, bodily privacy, and decisional autonomy as essential aspects of life and liberty. It reaffirmed the transformative vision of the Constitution, aligning it with modern notions of human rights and technology.

4.6 Right to Education

Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992)

The Court held that the right to education flows from the right to life, since life and dignity are meaningless without access to education.

Later, in Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993), the Court held that the right to free education up to the age of 14 years is a fundamental right.

This interpretation led to the 86th Constitutional Amendment (2002) inserting Article 21-A, making education a justiciable right.

4.7 Right to Speedy Trial

Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979)

The Court held that the right to a speedy trial is implicit in Article 21. The prolonged detention of undertrial prisoners was declared unconstitutional.

This case led to large-scale release of prisoners and reformation of criminal justice procedures.

4.8 Right to Shelter

Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1996)

The Court held that the right to shelter is included within the right to life. Shelter does not merely mean a roof over one’s head but includes the right to adequate living conditions conducive to health and well-being.

4.9 Right to Die with Dignity

Common Cause v. Union of India (2018)

The Supreme Court recognized the right to die with dignity as part of the right to life. It legalized passive euthanasia under strict safeguards and recognized advance medical directives (living wills).

The judgment emphasized that the dignity of life includes dignity in the process of dying.

4.10 Right to Reputation and Dignity

Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016)

The Court held that the right to reputation is a part of the right to life under Article 21 and must be balanced against freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a).

5. Transformative Character of the Constitution

The expansive interpretation of Article 21 demonstrates the transformative constitutionalism of India. The judiciary has evolved the Constitution from a legal document into a living instrument of social justice, embedding within it the ideals of dignity, liberty, and equality.

Through Maneka Gandhi and subsequent cases, Article 21 has become a repository of unenumerated rights — a vehicle through which socio-economic rights, though originally placed in the Directive Principles, have become enforceable as fundamental rights.

The Indian judiciary thus acts as a catalyst for constitutional evolution, ensuring that the Constitution adapts to contemporary moral, technological, and environmental realities.

6. Conclusion

The journey of Article 21 from A.K. Gopalan to K.S. Puttaswamy is the story of India’s constitutional transformation — from procedural formality to substantive justice. It reflects how the judiciary has infused humanistic values into constitutional interpretation, expanding the right to life from mere animal existence to a life of dignity, autonomy, and freedom.

As Justice Bhagwati once observed,

“The right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it.”

Through such progressive interpretation, Article 21 continues to embody the transformative and living spirit of the Indian Constitution, ensuring that it remains relevant to the evolving aspirations of society. 

1. Introduction

The Constitution of India guarantees six fundamental freedoms under Article 19(1), which form the cornerstone of democratic life. These freedoms enable every citizen to express themselves, associate freely, move and reside across the country, and pursue any occupation of choice. However, these freedoms are not absolute. The State may impose reasonable restrictions on them in the interests of sovereignty, public order, morality, and other constitutionally recognized grounds.

Article 19 thus strikes a balance between individual liberty and social control, ensuring that freedom is exercised responsibly within constitutional limits.

2. Fundamental Freedoms under Article 19(1)

Article 19(1) guarantees six fundamental freedoms exclusively to citizens of India, not to foreigners. These are as follows:

1. Freedom of Speech and Expression — Article 19(1)(a)
2. Freedom to Assemble Peaceably and Without Arms — Article 19(1)(b)
3. Freedom to Form Associations or Unions or Co-operative Societies — Article 19(1)(c)
4. Freedom to Move Freely Throughout the Territory of India — Article 19(1)(d)
5. Freedom to Reside and Settle in Any Part of the Territory of India — Article 19(1)(e)
6. Freedom to Practise Any Profession or to Carry on Any Occupation, Trade or Business — Article 19(1)(g)

Each of these freedoms is essential to the functioning of democracy and the development of individual personality. Yet, each is subject to the limitations mentioned in clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19.

3. Nature and Scope of Each Freedom

3.1 Freedom of Speech and Expression — Article 19(1)(a)

This freedom includes the right to express one’s opinions freely by words, writing, printing, pictures, or any other medium. It encompasses freedom of the press, artistic expression, and even symbolic acts like demonstrations or silence.

Case Law: Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras (1950)

Facts:

The State of Madras imposed a ban on the circulation of the petitioner’s political journal Cross Roads, citing threats to public order.

Issue:

Whether the ban violated the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).

Rule:

Article 19(2) allows restrictions only on specified grounds like public order, decency, or security of the State.

Application:

The Court held that since “public order” was not a ground of restriction under Article 19(2) as it then stood, the restriction was unconstitutional.

Conclusion:

The case led to the First Constitutional Amendment, 1951, which added “public order” as a ground for restriction, expanding the balance between liberty and State interest.

Freedom of speech also includes the right to information, broadcasting rights, and dissent — all of which are vital to a vibrant democracy.

3.2 Freedom of Assembly — Article 19(1)(b)

This guarantees the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Peaceful protest is an essential democratic instrument for public expression. However, the right does not extend to violent or armed gatherings.

Case Law: Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra (1961)

Facts:

A citizen challenged the validity of Section 144 of the CrPC, which empowers authorities to restrict assemblies in certain situations.

Issue:

Whether Section 144 violates the freedom of assembly.

Rule:

The State may impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order under Article 19(3).

Application:

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 144, observing that the restriction was preventive, not punitive, and necessary to maintain order.

Conclusion:

The right to assemble is subject to the condition that it must be peaceful and not detrimental to public order.

3.3 Freedom of Association — Article 19(1)(c)

This includes the right to form associations, unions, or co-operative societies for lawful purposes, such as political, social, or cultural interests. However, the right to form does not necessarily include the right to recognition or continued existence.

Case Law: Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India (1971)

Facts:

The government passed a law altering the composition of a registered society, thereby forcing new members upon it.

Issue:

Whether the alteration of membership violated the association’s right under Article 19(1)(c).

Rule:

The freedom to form associations implies the right to continue the association with its chosen members.

Application:

The Supreme Court struck down the law, holding that compulsory alteration of membership destroyed the very purpose of free association.

Conclusion:

The case affirmed that the State cannot interfere with the internal autonomy of associations except through reasonable restrictions under Article 19(4).

3.4 Freedom of Movement — Article 19(1)(d)

This gives citizens the right to move freely throughout India. It ensures national integration and equality among states. Restrictions can, however, be imposed for public order or to protect the interests of scheduled tribes.

3.5 Freedom of Residence and Settlement — Article 19(1)(e)

Citizens are free to reside and settle in any part of India, promoting unity and national cohesion. Restrictions may be imposed in the interests of the general public or for the protection of scheduled tribes to prevent exploitation.

Case Law: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushalya (1964)

The Court held that reasonable restrictions can be imposed to maintain public health, safety, or order, including prohibiting residence in certain areas for administrative necessity.

3.6 Freedom of Profession, Occupation, Trade, or Business — Article 19(1)(g)

This guarantees the right to choose any lawful employment or trade. However, professional and business activities are subject to State regulation in the interests of the public.

Case Law: Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1950)

Facts:

The government prohibited the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season to ensure labour availability for farming.

Issue:

Whether the total prohibition violated Article 19(1)(g).

Rule:

Restrictions under Article 19(6) must be reasonable and not excessive.

Application:

The Court held that a complete ban on manufacturing bidis during the season was an unreasonable restriction.

Conclusion:

The restriction was struck down as arbitrary. The case established that reasonableness depends on the proportionality between the restriction and the objective sought.

4. Reasonable Restrictions under Article 19(2)–(6)

The freedoms under Article 19(1) are not absolute; the Constitution permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions to protect collective interests. The term “reasonable” implies that the restriction must not be arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate.

1. Under Article 19(2), freedom of speech may be restricted for the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence.
2. Under Article 19(3), the freedom of assembly may be restricted in the interests of public order and sovereignty.
3. Under Article 19(4), the right to association may be restricted in the interests of public order, morality, or the sovereignty and integrity of India.
4. Under Articles 19(5) and 19(6), the freedoms of movement, residence, and trade may be restricted for the general public interest, health, safety, or protection of scheduled tribes.

Case Law: State of Madras v. V.G. Row (1952)

Facts:

The government declared an association unlawful under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, and the petitioner challenged it as violating Article 19(1)(c).

Issue:

What constitutes a “reasonable restriction” under Article 19?

Rule:

Reasonableness must be determined by examining the nature of the right, purpose of restriction, and the proportionality between means and ends.

Application:

The Supreme Court struck down the restriction as unreasonable because it was not justified by any imminent threat to public order.

Conclusion:

This case laid down the test of reasonableness — restrictions must be proportionate, non-arbitrary, and justifiable in a democratic society.

5. Principles Evolved from Judicial Interpretation

1. Restrictions must be imposed by law, not by executive order.
2. Restrictions must be reasonable — they must balance individual liberty and social interest.
3. The burden of proof lies on the State to justify the reasonableness.
4. Judicial review is available to test whether the restriction satisfies constitutional requirements.

These principles ensure that State power does not destroy the essence of liberty guaranteed by Article 19.

6. Conclusion

Article 19 is the heart of Indian democracy. It guarantees individual freedoms essential to human dignity and collective progress. However, liberty is meaningful only when exercised within the framework of social responsibility. Therefore, the Constitution permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions to protect public order, morality, and national security.

The evolution of judicial interpretation — from Romesh Thapar to V.G. Row and Chintaman Rao — shows that Article 19 is not a static right but a living guarantee, capable of balancing freedom with social harmony. The courts remain the vigilant guardians of this balance, ensuring that liberty is preserved while maintaining the welfare and stability of the State. 

Introduction

The Right Against Exploitation is one of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution of India. It aims to preserve human dignity and protect individuals, especially the poor and vulnerable, from practices that degrade or exploit them.

This right is embodied in Articles 23 and 24, which collectively prohibit slavery, begar (forced labour), trafficking, and child labour. These provisions form a vital part of India’s commitment to human rights, social justice, and equality.

Article 23 — Prohibition of Traffic in Human Beings and Forced Labour

Text and Scope

Article 23(1) declares that traffic in human beings, begar, and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited, and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.

Article 23(2) permits the State to impose compulsory service for public purposes, provided it does not discriminate on grounds of religion, race, caste, or class.

Thus, the article protects every individual — citizen or non-citizen — against exploitation by private persons as well as the State.

(a) Prohibition of Forced Labour

Meaning of Forced Labour

“Begar” means involuntary work or service extracted without payment. “Forced labour” extends beyond physical compulsion; it includes situations where a person works due to poverty, debt, social custom, or economic necessity that leaves no real choice.

The Supreme Court has interpreted this article liberally to include all forms of exploitation that deprive a person of freedom of choice in employment.

Judicial Interpretation

People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) v. Union of India (1982)

Facts:

A public interest petition was filed highlighting the plight of construction workers engaged in building projects for the Asian Games in Delhi. They were paid wages lower than the statutory minimum.

Issue:

Whether paying less than the minimum wage amounts to “forced labour” under Article 23.

Rule:

The right to receive minimum wages is part of the right to life with dignity under Article 21, and any compulsion to work for less than that amount constitutes forced labour.

Application:

The Supreme Court held that economic necessity compelling a person to work for less than minimum wages is a form of coercion. Thus, it violates Article 23 even without physical force.

Conclusion:

The Court broadened the meaning of forced labour, holding that Article 23 strikes at all forms of economic and physical coercion that make a person labour against their will.

Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan (1983)

Facts:

Labourers engaged in famine-relief work were paid wages below the statutory minimum.

Issue:

Whether payment of less than minimum wages in public relief work violates Article 23.

Rule:

The State cannot take advantage of poverty or distress to extract work on wages below the minimum standard fixed by law.

Application and Conclusion:

The Court held that even in famine-relief operations, workers must receive minimum wages; otherwise, it amounts to exploitation and forced labour under Article 23.

This decision reinforced that Article 23 applies against both private and State exploitation.

Significance

Through these decisions, the Supreme Court transformed Article 23 into a powerful instrument of social justice, expanding its scope beyond slavery to include modern forms of bonded labour, trafficking, and economic compulsion.

It paved the way for several legislations, including the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, and for enforcement actions through public interest litigation.

Article 24 — Prohibition of Employment of Children in Factories and Hazardous Occupations

Text and Scope

Article 24 provides that no child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed in any factory, mine, or any other hazardous employment.

Unlike Article 23, which is universal, Article 24 is confined to children and aims at protecting their health, development, and education. It reflects the constitutional vision of securing a safe and dignified childhood for every child.

(b) Prohibition of Child Labour

Judicial Interpretation

People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982)

In the same Asian Games case, the Court condemned the employment of children in construction work as violative of Article 24 and directed the government to ensure compliance with labour laws protecting children.

M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996)

Facts:

A public interest petition was filed highlighting the employment of children in match and fireworks factories in Sivakasi, Tamil Nadu.

Issue:

Whether the employment of children in hazardous industries violates Article 24 and what remedial measures should be taken.

Rule:

Article 24 absolutely prohibits employment of children under fourteen years in hazardous industries. The State has an obligation under Articles 39(e), 39(f), and 45 (Directive Principles) to protect children from exploitation and provide education.

Application:

The Supreme Court directed the closure of all child-employing factories, ordered their rehabilitation, and mandated the creation of a Child Labour Rehabilitation Fund. It emphasized compulsory education as a preventive measure.

Conclusion:

The Court recognized child labour as a form of social and economic exploitation that violates both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Legislative Measures Supporting Article 24

Several laws give effect to the constitutional prohibition, such as:

• The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, prohibiting the employment of children in hazardous occupations and regulating working conditions in others.
• The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, implementing Article 21-A and linking education with abolition of child labour.
• The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, ensuring rehabilitation of child workers and victims of exploitation.

Interrelationship Between Articles 23 and 24

Both Articles are complementary — Article 23 ensures freedom from economic and physical exploitation, while Article 24 protects children from moral and material exploitation. Together, they guarantee that human dignity and labour are not treated as commodities.

These rights are available against both State and private individuals, showing that the Constitution recognizes exploitation as a social evil, not merely a governmental act.

Conclusion

The Right Against Exploitation enshrined in Articles 23 and 24 embodies the humanitarian spirit of the Constitution. It abolishes all forms of slavery, bonded labour, and child exploitation, affirming the State’s duty to secure a dignified existence for every individual.

Through judicial interpretation, particularly in PUDR, Sanjit Roy, and M.C. Mehta, the Supreme Court has expanded these provisions into living instruments of social transformation. The right against exploitation, therefore, is not confined to theory but operates as a practical guarantee of human dignity, economic justice, and equality of opportunity. 

Introduction

Equality is one of the foundational values of the Indian Constitution. It forms the core of justice — social, economic, and political — as proclaimed in the Preamble. The concept of equality is embodied primarily in Articles 14 to 18 under the heading “Right to Equality”.

However, equality is not a fixed or rigid idea. It is an evolving, dynamic, and living concept, adapting to changing social realities and economic conditions. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that equality cannot be “cribbed, cabined, and confined” within doctrinal or traditional limits; it must grow with the needs of the time.

This famous phrase was used by Justice Bhagwati in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974), where he transformed the meaning of equality from a narrow formal notion to a broad, substantive one.

Traditional (Doctrinal) View of Equality

In its early interpretation, equality under Article 14 was understood to mean “equality before law” and “equal protection of laws.”

• Equality before law is a negative concept, meaning that no one is above the law and all are equally subject to it.
• Equal protection of laws is a positive concept, implying equal treatment of persons who are similarly situated.

Under this traditional view, courts applied the doctrine of reasonable classification, which permitted laws to treat different groups differently if there was a rational nexus between the classification and the legislative objective.

This approach, though useful, was formalistic and static — it failed to address deeper structural inequalities caused by social and economic hierarchies.

Emergence of Dynamic Equality — Judicial Evolution

The post-Independence period saw the judiciary expand the meaning of equality to meet the needs of a developing and welfare-oriented society. The Court began to interpret equality as substantive and purposive, not merely formal.

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974)

Facts:

Royappa, a senior IAS officer, challenged his transfer as arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Issue:

Whether administrative arbitrariness violates the constitutional guarantee of equality.

Rule:

Article 14 does not merely prohibit discriminatory classification; it also strikes at arbitrariness in State action.

Application:

Justice Bhagwati observed that equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. Where an act is arbitrary, it is inherently unequal, regardless of classification.

Conclusion:

The Court held that equality is a dynamic concept that transcends doctrinal limits. It must be interpreted to ensure fairness in State action. This case marked a shift from the “classification test” to the “arbitrariness test.”

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

Facts:

The petitioner’s passport was impounded by the government without furnishing reasons, allegedly violating Articles 14, 19, and 21.

Issue:

Whether arbitrary executive action that restricts personal liberty can violate Article 14.

Rule:

The procedure established by law must be just, fair, and reasonable — not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive.

Application:

The Court linked Articles 14, 19, and 21 together, forming a “golden triangle” of rights that protect liberty through the lens of equality and reasonableness.

Conclusion:

Equality under Article 14 became the essence of the rule of law — a guarantee against arbitrariness in any form, legislative or executive.

Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (1981)

Facts:

Admission procedures in an engineering college were challenged as discriminatory and arbitrary.

Issue:

Whether an arbitrary action by an instrumentality of the State violates Article 14.

Rule and Application:

The Court reiterated that arbitrariness in State action amounts to denial of equality. Article 14 ensures fairness and non-arbitrariness in every sphere of State activity.

Conclusion:

Equality applies not only to legislation but also to administrative and contractual actions of the State.

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992)

Facts:

The constitutional validity of reservations for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) was challenged.

Issue:

Whether affirmative action violates the principle of equality.

Rule:

Equality under the Constitution means real and effective equality, not mere formal equality. Positive discrimination in favour of disadvantaged groups promotes equality in substance.

Application:

The Court upheld reservations, observing that equality requires treating unequals unequally to achieve genuine parity.

Conclusion:

This case established the doctrine of substantive equality, affirming that affirmative action is consistent with Article 14.

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)

Facts:

The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalized same-sex relations.

Issue:

Whether criminalizing consensual homosexual acts violates equality under Article 14.

Rule:

Article 14 prohibits arbitrary and unreasonable classification that stigmatizes a section of society.

Application:

The Court held that the law was arbitrary and violated dignity and privacy. It reaffirmed that equality is an evolving concept rooted in human dignity and inclusivity.

Conclusion:

Equality must be interpreted in tune with contemporary values, protecting individual autonomy and diversity.

Dimensions of Equality

Equality under the Indian Constitution has several interconnected dimensions:

1. Formal Equality: Equal treatment of persons who are similarly situated (traditional view).
2. Substantive Equality: Ensuring equal outcomes by removing social and economic barriers.
3. Protective Discrimination: Special provisions for women, children, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and other backward classes under Articles 15(3), 15(4), and 16(4).
4. Equality of Opportunity: Guaranteed in public employment under Article 16.
5. Social and Economic Equality: Envisioned in the Directive Principles of State Policy, complementing Fundamental Rights.

Thus, equality under the Constitution is not merely a legal formula; it is a transformative principle aimed at achieving real justice.

Conclusion

Equality in India has evolved from a rigid, doctrinal idea to a dynamic and transformative concept. It now encompasses fairness, non-arbitrariness, inclusivity, and substantive justice. The Supreme Court has interpreted Article 14 not only as a prohibition against discrimination but as a guarantee of fairness and reasonableness in every action of the State.

As Justice Bhagwati aptly stated in E.P. Royappa,

“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions; it cannot be cribbed, cabined, and confined within traditional and doctrinal limits.”

This vision ensures that equality remains the lifeblood of the Constitution, constantly adapting to social progress and guiding India toward a more just and humane order. 

Introduction

The Fundamental Duties of citizens are contained in Part IV-A of the Indian Constitution, inserted by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976, on the recommendation of the Swaran Singh Committee. They are enumerated in Article 51-A, which originally listed ten duties; an eleventh duty was added later by the 86th Amendment, 2002, relating to education for children.

While Fundamental Rights provide freedom to citizens, Fundamental Duties remind them of corresponding obligations toward the nation and society. They represent the moral vision of the Constitution — balancing individual liberty with civic responsibility.

Constitutional Background and Origin

The framers of the Constitution initially did not include Fundamental Duties, as they believed that citizens of an independent nation would naturally act with civic responsibility. However, during the period of political turmoil in the 1970s, it was felt that rights without duties led to indiscipline and disregard for national interest. The 42nd Amendment therefore introduced Article 51-A to emphasize that every citizen must contribute to the unity, integrity, and welfare of India.

Text of Article 51-A

Article 51-A lays down duties such as respecting the Constitution, cherishing national ideals, defending the country, promoting harmony, protecting the environment, developing scientific temper, and striving for excellence in all spheres of life. The 86th Amendment added the duty of parents or guardians to provide opportunities for education to their children between six and fourteen years of age.

Significance of Fundamental Duties

The Fundamental Duties hold immense significance for the moral and civic life of citizens:

1. Moral Compass for Citizens: They act as reminders that every right carries a corresponding duty. The performance of duties ensures that the exercise of rights does not harm others or the State.
2. Promote National Unity and Integrity: Duties such as respecting the Constitution and preserving the unity and integrity of India reinforce national solidarity and strengthen democracy.
3. Supplement to Fundamental Rights: Duties balance the enjoyment of Fundamental Rights and ensure that liberty does not degenerate into license. They form the ethical counterpart of Part III of the Constitution.
4. Inspire Patriotism and Discipline: Duties like defending the nation and promoting harmony instill civic spirit, patriotism, and respect for law and order.
5. Environmental and Social Responsibility: The duty to protect the environment, forests, and wildlife has become crucial in an era of ecological degradation. Courts have relied upon this duty while interpreting environmental laws.
6. Guidance for Legislative and Executive Action: Fundamental Duties provide a constitutional basis for enacting laws and framing policies that promote responsible citizenship, such as environmental protection laws, educational reforms, and cultural preservation.
7. Foundation for a Responsible Democracy: By emphasizing obligations toward society, Fundamental Duties strengthen participatory democracy and collective responsibility.

Judicial Interpretation and Enforceability

Although the Fundamental Duties are non-justiciable (that is, not directly enforceable in a court of law), the judiciary has played an important role in making them practically enforceable through interpretation and indirect means.

Enforceability

The duties are not legally binding in the same way as Fundamental Rights; no citizen can be punished merely for violating them unless a law specifically provides a penalty. However, several laws have been enacted to give effect to these duties — for example, the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, the Environment Protection Act, 1986, and the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972. These statutes translate certain duties into enforceable obligations.

1. Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India (1984)

Facts:

A petition was filed highlighting the exploitation of Indian children adopted by foreign couples without proper safeguards. It was alleged that the existing adoption procedures violated the dignity and welfare of the child.

Issue:

Whether the State had an obligation to regulate inter-country adoption to protect children’s rights and welfare.

Rule:

Article 51-A(e) and (j) impose duties on citizens to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women and to strive for excellence. The State, as a collective expression of the people’s will, shares the moral responsibility to protect children, who are among the most vulnerable members of society.

Application:

The Supreme Court relied on the principles of Fundamental Duties to issue detailed guidelines ensuring that inter-country adoptions were carried out only through recognized agencies and in the best interests of the child.

Conclusion:

The Court emphasized that the duty to protect children stems not only from constitutional rights but also from Fundamental Duties. The judgment gave practical effect to Article 51-A by integrating it with the State’s obligation under Articles 14 and 21.

2. Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1985)

Facts:

A public interest litigation was filed to prevent limestone quarrying in the Mussoorie-Dehradun belt, which was causing severe environmental degradation and health hazards.

Issue:

Whether closure of mining operations to prevent ecological imbalance could be justified under the Constitution.

Rule:

Article 51-A(g) imposes a duty on every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment, including forests, lakes, and wildlife. Article 21 guarantees the right to life, which includes the right to live in a healthy environment.

Application:

The Court linked Article 51-A(g) with Article 21 and held that protecting and improving the environment is both a legal and moral duty of citizens and the State. It ordered closure of harmful mining operations in the interest of environmental preservation.

Conclusion:

This case was the first to give binding effect to environmental duties under Article 51-A(g), thereby transforming a moral duty into a judicially enforceable obligation through its connection with the right to life.

3. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987)

Facts:

A gas leak from a factory in Delhi caused serious harm to residents and workers. Environmental activist M.C. Mehta filed a public interest petition seeking accountability and preventive measures against such hazards.

Issue:

Whether citizens and industries have a constitutional duty to protect the environment under Article 51-A(g).

Rule:

Article 51-A(g) mandates the duty to protect and improve the natural environment, while Article 21 guarantees the right to life. The principle of “absolute liability” was also evolved in this case.

Application:

The Supreme Court interpreted Article 51-A(g) as creating a reciprocal obligation on both individuals and industries. It held that industries engaged in hazardous activities owe an absolute duty to ensure that no harm is caused to people or the environment.

Conclusion:

The Court expanded environmental jurisprudence by reading Fundamental Duties along with Fundamental Rights, establishing that environmental protection is not merely a policy goal but a constitutional responsibility.

4. AIIMS Students Union v. AIIMS (2001)

Facts:

Students challenged certain decisions of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences regarding reservations and institutional policies, arguing that these were inconsistent with constitutional principles.

Issue:

Whether Fundamental Duties can guide constitutional interpretation and administrative policy even though they are non-justiciable.

Rule:

Article 51-A lays down duties which, though not enforceable by courts, are obligatory for citizens and can inform the interpretation of laws and executive actions.

Application:

The Supreme Court held that Fundamental Duties, though not directly enforceable, serve as valuable interpretative tools for understanding the spirit of the Constitution. They must guide both citizens and institutions in discharging their constitutional functions in a manner consistent with morality and justice.

Conclusion:

The Court clarified that Fundamental Duties have persuasive value in constitutional adjudication and can be invoked to sustain the validity of laws and policies promoting constitutional morality.

5. Ranganath Mishra Committee Report (1999)

Facts:

The Government of India appointed the Justice Ranganath Mishra Committee to review the working of Fundamental Duties and suggest ways to strengthen their implementation.

Issue:

Whether Fundamental Duties should remain only moral obligations or be made legally enforceable through legislative or constitutional measures.

Rule:

The Committee reviewed Article 51-A and noted that while duties are essential for civic discipline, their effectiveness depends on their enforceability.

Application:

The Committee recommended that Parliament should enact laws to give legal effect to Fundamental Duties wherever possible, and that these duties should be taught in educational institutions to promote civic consciousness.

Conclusion:

Although the recommendations have not been fully implemented, they underscore the growing constitutional and social importance of Fundamental Duties and their potential for legal enforcement in the future. Relationship Between Rights and Duties

Fundamental Duties and Fundamental Rights are two sides of the same constitutional coin. Rights confer freedom, while duties impose responsibility. The harmony between the two ensures social order and constitutional balance. The judiciary has emphasized that Fundamental Duties must guide interpretation of Fundamental Rights, ensuring that rights are exercised responsibly and not to the detriment of public interest.

Practical Significance

In modern times, duties have been invoked to promote environmental awareness, gender equality, secularism, and civic ethics. Educational institutions are expected to instill these duties among students. They also serve as moral parameters for assessing the conduct of public officials and citizens alike. By performing these duties, citizens help transform constitutional ideals into living realities.

Limitations

The primary limitation of Fundamental Duties is their non-justiciable character. They cannot be enforced directly by courts unless the legislature passes laws specifying penalties for their violation. Moreover, the awareness and observance of these duties among citizens remain limited. To make them effective, civic education, public participation, and awareness programs are essential.

Conclusion

Fundamental Duties, though not directly enforceable, form a vital part of the constitutional philosophy of India. They remind citizens that the Constitution not only guarantees rights but also expects certain obligations in return. They serve as instruments of social cohesion, national integration, and responsible citizenship. Courts and legislatures have increasingly used them to promote environmental protection, education, and national respect.

Thus, the Fundamental Duties, though moral and non-justiciable in nature, are indispensable for the sustenance of democracy. As the Supreme Court observed, rights and duties are complementary: one cannot exist meaningfully without the other. A society that performs its duties faithfully will naturally secure the rights of all its members. 

Introduction

The Fundamental Rights, contained in Part III of the Indian Constitution (Articles 12 to 35), guarantee basic liberties and protect individuals against arbitrary action by the State. They form the cornerstone of democracy and the rule of law in India. However, these rights are not absolute. The Constitution recognizes that in certain exceptional circumstances, Parliament or State Legislatures may make laws that restrict or derogate from Fundamental Rights. Thus, while these rights are sacrosanct, the Constitution allows limited derogation to balance individual liberty with public interest and national security.

Meaning of “Law in Derogation of Fundamental Rights”

A law is said to be in derogation of Fundamental Rights when it takes away or abridges any of the rights guaranteed under Part III. Such laws, unless protected by specific constitutional provisions, are void to the extent of their inconsistency. However, the Constitution itself provides certain grounds, exceptions, and safeguards under which Fundamental Rights can be restricted, regulated, or suspended.

Constitutional Provisions Permitting Derogation

Article 13

Article 13 declares that all pre-Constitution laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. It also prohibits the State from making any law that takes away or abridges Fundamental Rights. However, by the Twenty-fourth Amendment, laws made in exercise of the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 are excluded from this prohibition. Thus, ordinary laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are void, but constitutional amendments are not automatically invalid.

Reasonable Restrictions

Several Fundamental Rights contain built-in provisions permitting the State to impose reasonable restrictions. For example, freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) can be restricted in the interests of public order, decency, morality, defamation, contempt of court, or sovereignty and integrity of India. Similarly, the freedom of assembly, association, movement, and trade under Article 19(1)(b) to (g) can be restricted in the interests of public order, morality, or the general public. The freedom of religion under Article 25 is also subject to public order, morality, and health.

Special Provisions

Parliament may, under Article 33, restrict or abrogate Fundamental Rights in their application to members of the armed forces or police forces to ensure discipline. Under Article 34, during the operation of martial law, Parliament can indemnify persons for acts done under martial law, even if they derogate from Fundamental Rights. Article 35 gives Parliament exclusive power to make laws regarding preventive detention, which also involves restrictions on liberty.

During National Emergency

The Constitution further allows suspension of certain Fundamental Rights during emergencies. Under Article 358, when a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352 is in force, the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 are automatically suspended. Under Article 359, the President may, by order, suspend the right to move any court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights, except those under Articles 20 and 21 after the Forty-fourth Amendment. This ensures that the core rights of life and liberty remain protected even during emergencies.

Protective Provisions: Articles 31A, 31B, and 31C

Article 31A protects laws relating to agrarian reforms and acquisition of estates from challenge on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19. Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule protect specific laws from judicial review, even if they violate Fundamental Rights, though this protection is now subject to the basic structure doctrine. Article 31C protects laws giving effect to Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Articles 39(b) and 39(c), stating that such laws cannot be challenged for violating Articles 14 or 19. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that this protection does not extend to all Directive Principles.

FIRAC Analysis Through Landmark Cases

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)

A.K. Gopalan, a communist leader, was detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and he challenged it as violative of Articles 19 and 21. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether preventive detention was unconstitutional as being in derogation of Fundamental Rights. The Court held that each Fundamental Right was separate and independent, and that as long as the detention was according to “procedure established by law,” Article 21 was not violated. The Preventive Detention Act was upheld. However, this narrow interpretation of rights was later overruled by the Maneka Gandhi case.

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

In this historic case, the petitioner challenged certain constitutional amendments that affected his property rights, contending that they violated Fundamental Rights. The Court held that although Parliament has wide powers to amend the Constitution under Article 368, it cannot alter or destroy its basic structure. This means that even laws or amendments in derogation of Fundamental Rights are invalid if they damage the basic structure. The case established the supremacy of the Constitution and judicial review over parliamentary power.

A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976)

During the Emergency of 1975, the right to move courts for enforcement of Fundamental Rights was suspended under Article 359. Several detainees filed habeas corpus petitions, challenging their detention. The Supreme Court, by majority, held that during the Emergency, no person had any locus standi to challenge unlawful detention. Only Justice H.R. Khanna dissented, asserting that the right to life and liberty is not dependent on the Constitution and cannot be taken away even in an Emergency. This judgment was widely condemned, and the Forty-fourth Amendment later ensured that Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended during an Emergency.

I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007)

This case dealt with laws placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. The issue was whether such laws, even if inconsistent with Fundamental Rights, could be completely immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court held that all laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 (the date of Kesavananda Bharati), are subject to judicial review and must pass the test of the basic structure doctrine. Thus, Parliament cannot use the Ninth Schedule to protect laws that destroy the essence of Fundamental Rights.

Important Doctrines

The Doctrine of Severability states that if part of a statute is unconstitutional, only that part will be void, provided the rest can stand independently. This ensures that only the offending provision is struck down, not the entire law. The Doctrine of Eclipse applies mainly to pre-Constitution laws that are inconsistent with Fundamental Rights. Such laws are not dead but remain in a dormant state and can revive if the inconsistency is removed, for instance, by amendment of the Constitution.

Safeguards Against Misuse

The Indian judiciary serves as the ultimate guardian of Fundamental Rights through its power of judicial review under Articles 32 and 226. The Basic Structure Doctrine limits Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. The Forty-fourth Amendment strengthened protections by making Articles 20 and 21 non-suspendable even during emergencies. The separation of powers between the legislature, executive, and judiciary also ensures that no organ of the State acts arbitrarily in derogation of Fundamental Rights.

Conclusion

Laws in derogation of Fundamental Rights represent a delicate constitutional balance between individual liberty and collective security. The framers of the Constitution recognized that absolute freedom could endanger the stability of the State, while unchecked power could destroy liberty. Hence, limited derogations are permitted under strict constitutional and judicial safeguards. The evolution of judicial interpretation — from A.K. Gopalan to I.R. Coelho — demonstrates that while rights may be regulated, their essence remains inviolable. The judiciary, through the doctrine of basic structure, ensures that the spirit of Fundamental Rights continues to guide Indian democracy.

“The Constitution is not a mere lawyer’s document; it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age.” — Justice Vivian Bose 

I. Introduction

India is a land of immense cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity.

To preserve this diversity and ensure that minority communities can maintain their distinct identity, the Constitution provides Cultural and Educational Rights under Articles 29 and 30.

These rights aim to achieve unity in diversity — allowing every community to preserve its language, script, and culture while promoting national integration.

II. Constitutional Provisions

Article 29 — Protection of Interests of Minorities

1. Article 29(1):

   Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script, or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.

   ➤ Applies to any group, not only minorities.

2. Article 29(2):

   No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving State aid on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language, or any of them.

   ➤ This clause protects individual citizens against discrimination in admission.

Article 30 — Right of Minorities to Establish and Administer Educational Institutions

1. Article 30(1):

   All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

2. Article 30(1A): (Inserted by the 44th Amendment, 1978)

   In case such institutions’ property is acquired by the State, the compensation must not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed.

3. Article 30(2):

   The State shall not discriminate in granting aid to educational institutions on the ground that they are minority institutions.

III. Difference between Article 29 and Article 30

BasisArticle 29Article 30BeneficiariesAny section of citizensOnly religious or linguistic minoritiesNatureProtects culture, language, and scriptProtects right to establish & administer educational institutionsType of rightIndividual and collectiveCollective right of minoritiesScopeIncludes all citizensLimited to minorities only

IV. FIRAC ANALYSIS OF IMPORTANT CASES

CASE 1: State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (AIR 1951 SC 226)

Facts:

The Government of Madras reserved seats in state educational institutions for different communities based on religion and caste. A Brahmin candidate, Champakam Dorairajan, was denied admission despite having higher marks.

Issue:

Whether such communal reservation violated Article 29(2) which prohibits discrimination in admission on grounds of religion, race, caste, language, etc.

Rule:

Article 29(2) guarantees equality in admission to State or State-aided institutions.

Application:

The Supreme Court held that the communal G.O. violated Article 29(2) since it denied admission based solely on caste and religion.

Conclusion:

The communal reservation was struck down.

This case led to the First Constitutional Amendment (1951) inserting Article 15(4) allowing reservations for socially and educationally backward classes.

CASE 2: State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society (AIR 1954 SC 561)

Facts:

The State of Bombay directed that all primary education in schools aided by the government must be imparted only in Marathi or Gujarati, effectively restricting English-medium schools run by Anglo-Indian communities.

Issue:

Whether such restriction violated Articles 29(1) and 30(1).

Rule:

Minorities have the right to conserve their language and establish institutions of their choice.

Application:

The Court held that compelling a linguistic minority to impart education only in regional languages violated their rights under Articles 29(1) and 30(1).

Conclusion:

Minority communities are entitled to impart education in their own language.

CASE 3: In re The Kerala Education Bill (AIR 1958 SC 956)

Facts:

The Kerala Government passed a Bill imposing restrictions on management of educational institutions, including minority-run schools, particularly regarding appointment of teachers and admission procedures.

Issue:

Whether such State control over minority institutions violates Article 30(1).

Rule:

The right to administer is not absolute; reasonable regulations for maintaining academic standards and ensuring efficiency are valid, but State control must not destroy the minority character of the institution.

Application:

The Supreme Court advised that regulatory measures ensuring educational excellence are permissible, but control over day-to-day administration is not.

Conclusion:

The Bill was partly unconstitutional.

This case laid down the balance between autonomy and regulation.

CASE 4: St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1974 SC 1389)

Facts:

The Gujarat University Act imposed restrictions on the management and appointment of staff in colleges affiliated with the University, including minority institutions.

Issue:

Whether such restrictions violate Article 30(1).

Rule:

Minorities have a fundamental right to administer their institutions, though reasonable regulations to ensure academic standards are permissible.

Application:

The Supreme Court held that affiliation conditions cannot undermine the right of minorities to manage their own institutions.

Conclusion:

Article 30(1) ensures both establishment and autonomy in administration, subject to academic standards.

CASE 5: T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481

Facts:

The case challenged various government regulations on admission and fee structures in private and minority educational institutions.

Issue:

What is the scope of minority rights under Article 30 and whether the State can impose admission or fee regulations?

Rule:

A 11-judge Bench laid down that:

• The right to establish and administer includes admissions, staffing, and management.
• However, the State can impose reasonable regulations to ensure fairness and prevent exploitation.
• Both religious and linguistic minorities are determined state-wise.

Conclusion:

This landmark case clarified that minority institutions enjoy autonomy but must follow academic standards and transparency in admissions.

V. Scope of Administration under Article 30

The right to “administer” includes:

• Selection of students
• Appointment of staff
• Disciplinary control
• Choice of medium of instruction
• Use of property and funds

However, this right is not absolute. The State can regulate:

• Academic standards,
• Health and safety, and
• Conditions for recognition and affiliation, as long as they do not destroy the minority character of the institution.

VI. Importance of Cultural and Educational Rights

1. Preserves pluralism and cultural diversity.
2. Ensures minorities’ participation in the educational system.
3. Promotes inclusive national identity.
4. Balances unity with diversity — fundamental to Indian democracy.

VII. Criticisms and Challenges

• Difficulty in defining minorities (religious or linguistic, state-wise).
• Sometimes leads to misuse for commercial purposes.
• Requires balancing autonomy with accountability.
• Judicial inconsistencies in interpreting minority rights across states.

VIII. Conclusion

Cultural and Educational Rights under Articles 29 and 30 are the cornerstone of India’s secular and pluralistic democracy.

They ensure that every community, big or small, has the freedom to preserve its heritage and educate its members according to its own values — while remaining part of the Indian nation.

“The real test of democracy lies not in the rule of the majority, but in the protection of the minority.” — Supreme Court of India 

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India: A Constitutional Analysis

I. Introduction and Genesis

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is a revolutionary concept in Indian jurisprudence that grants any public-spirited citizen or social action group the right to move the court for the enforcement of the constitutional or legal rights of a person or class of persons who, owing to poverty or other disadvantages, cannot approach the court themselves.

A. The Purpose of PIL:
The primary objective of PIL is to ensure access to justice for the marginalized, maintain the Rule of Law, and uphold the core values enshrined in Part III and Part IV (Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy) of the Constitution. It is a tool of Judicial Activism aimed at achieving social justice.

B. Pioneers:
The genesis of modern PIL in India is attributed to the judicial activism of the Supreme Court in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While Justices V.R. Krishna Iyer and P.N. Bhagwati spearheaded the judicial innovation, the title of “Mother of PIL” belongs to advocate Pushpa Kapila Hingorani, who filed the seminal Hussainara Khatoon case (1979).

II. Relaxation of Locus Standi (The Core Principle)

The most significant feature of PIL is the relaxation of the traditional rule of Locus Standi.

Traditional Rule (Locus Standi)

PIL (Locus Standi Relaxation)

Only the person whose rights are directly infringed (aggrieved party) can move the court.

Any public-spirited individual or organization can approach the court on behalf of the aggrieved party.

Litigation is adversarial and strictly private in nature.

Litigation is collaborative (Social Action Litigation) and focuses on public harm.

This relaxation paved the way for the judicial innovation of Epistolary Jurisdiction, where the Supreme Court began treating even letters, telegrams, or newspaper reports addressed to the judge as a Writ Petition under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution.

III. Constitutional Basis and Procedure

PILs are generally filed in the superior courts under the extraordinary writ jurisdiction:

Supreme Court: Under Article 32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies) for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

High Courts: Under Article 226 (Power to Issue Writs) for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights and any other legal right.

The court has complete discretion on whether to admit a PIL and must be satisfied that the petition is filed bona fide and not for personal gain, private malice, or political vendetta.

IV. Landmark Cases and Judicial Milestones

The evolution of PIL can be traced through several pivotal judgments that expanded its scope:

Case Name

Year

Principle Established

Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar

1979

Recognized the Right to Speedy Trial as an intrinsic part of Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty). This is often considered the first reported PIL case.

S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (Judges’ Transfer Case)

1982

Officially affirmed the relaxed rule of locus standi, holding that “any member of the public or social action group acting bona fide” has standing. This case is considered the cornerstone of PIL jurisprudence in India.

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India

1984

Established the court’s right to appoint investigative commissions to gather facts regarding violations of fundamental rights (in this case, bonded labour), expanding the court’s remedial power beyond traditional court procedures.

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan

1997

Lacking a parliamentary law, the Supreme Court utilized PIL to lay down detailed binding guidelines (Vishaka Guidelines) to prevent sexual harassment at the workplace, demonstrating the court’s power to legislate interstitially under Article 32.

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Multiple Cases)

1986 onwards

A series of landmark PILs leading to judicial intervention on environmental issues, including the clean-up of the Ganga, the introduction of compulsory environmental education, and the control of vehicular pollution in Delhi, enforcing the Right to a Healthy Environment under Article 21.

V. Significance and Impact

PIL has transformed the Indian legal landscape by:

Democratizing Justice: Bringing the judiciary closer to the common man, especially the poor and illiterate.

Giving Content to Fundamental Rights: Converting Directive Principles (like environmental protection, free legal aid, right to education) into enforceable Fundamental Rights under Article 21.

Checking Executive Inaction: Holding the executive and public officials accountable for their constitutional and legal duties.

Social Engineering: Serving as a powerful tool for structural social reforms (e.g., abolition of bonded labour, reforms in prison administration, securing the right to food).

VI. Criticisms and Challenges

While hailed as a legal innovation, PIL faces several criticisms:

Judicial Overreach: Critics argue that PILs often lead the judiciary to transgress into the domains of the executive and the legislature (e.g., issuing directions on policy-making, budgetary allocations, or traffic management), blurring the line of separation of powers.

Frivolous Litigation: The relaxed locus standi has occasionally been misused by “busy-bodies” or for political rivalry, wasting judicial time and resources. The courts have sought to curb this by imposing heavy costs on non-genuine petitioners.

Lack of Implementation: Court orders in complex PIL cases, especially those involving policy or structural changes, often face significant difficulties in effective implementation by the executive branch, leading to “symbolic justice.”

Adversary to Adversarial System: PIL is a non-adversarial form of litigation, which sometimes conflicts with the due process and fact-finding mechanisms of the traditional adversarial system.

Conclusion: PIL remains a vital component of India’s constitutional framework, serving as a beacon of hope for the marginalized and a critical check on state power. Despite the valid concerns regarding judicial overreach and misuse, its contribution to the advancement of human rights and social justice makes it an indispensable element of the Indian legal system. 

I. Introduction

Preventive Detention means detaining a person in advance to prevent the possibility of a crime or an act prejudicial to public order or national security.

It is not a punishment for a past act, but a precautionary measure to stop future harm.

While most democratic constitutions forbid such detention, India’s Constitution explicitly permits it — reflecting the framers’ concern for national security and public order after Independence.

II. Constitutional Basis

Relevant Articles

• Article 22(1) & (2) — Protect individuals against arbitrary arrest and detention in ordinary cases (post-offence).
• Articles 22(3)–(7) — Provide exceptions for Preventive Detention.

Key Features

1. Preventive detention laws can be made by Parliament or State Legislatures (Entry 9, List I and Entry 3, List III, Seventh Schedule).
2. A person can be detained to prevent them from acting in a manner prejudicial to:

• the security of the State,
• the maintenance of public order,
• the maintenance of supplies and essential services, or
• India’s foreign relations or defense.

1. Preventive detention does not require proof of an offence; the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is sufficient.

III. Duration and Safeguards (Article 22 Clauses 4–7)

ProvisionSafeguard / PowerMaximum PeriodNo preventive detention can exceed 3 months unless approved by an Advisory Board.Advisory BoardComposed of High Court Judges who review detention within 3 months.Extended DetentionParliament may by law authorize detention beyond 3 months without Advisory Board opinion (e.g., under NSA).Communication of GroundsThe detenu must be informed of the grounds for detention “as soon as may be” but not necessarily before arrest.RepresentationThe detenu has a right to make a representation against the detention to the authority concerned.

IV. Preventive Detention Laws in India

• Preventive Detention Act, 1950 — first law; expired in 1969.
• MISA (Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971) — used widely during Emergency (1975–77).
• National Security Act (NSA), 1980) — presently in force.
• Other special laws: COFEPOSA (1974) for economic offences, PITNDPS (1988) for drug trafficking, etc.

V. FIRAC ANALYSIS THROUGH LANDMARK CASES

CASE 1: A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 27)

Facts:

A.K. Gopalan, a Communist leader, was detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. He challenged the detention as violating his Fundamental Rights, including personal liberty under Article 21 and protection under Article 19.

Issue:

Whether preventive detention violates Fundamental Rights, especially Articles 19, 21, and 22.

Rule:

Article 22 specifically provides for preventive detention; hence, the validity of such detention must be tested within Article 22, not under Article 19 or 21.

Application:

The Supreme Court upheld the detention, taking a narrow interpretation — each Fundamental Right was treated as separate and mutually exclusive.

It ruled that since Article 22 itself permits preventive detention, it could not be struck down on grounds of violation of Article 19 or 21.

Conclusion:

Detention was upheld. However, this case later came to be overruled in part by Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), which broadened the meaning of personal liberty.

CASE 2: Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597)

Facts:

Although not directly about detention, the case redefined Article 21 — holding that the “procedure established by law” must be fair, just, and reasonable.

Issue:

Whether personal liberty can be curtailed arbitrarily under preventive detention laws.

Rule:

Articles 14, 19, and 21 are interconnected; any law restricting personal liberty must satisfy the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.

Application:

After Maneka Gandhi, preventive detention laws are subject to judicial review on the grounds of procedural fairness and reasonableness.

Conclusion:

Expanded protection to detenus — preventive detention must now meet standards of natural justice and fairness.

CASE 3: A.K. Roy v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 710)

Facts:

The constitutionality of the National Security Ordinance, 1980 (later NSA) was challenged on grounds that it violated Articles 14, 19, and 21.

Issue:

Whether preventive detention under NSA violates Fundamental Rights.

Rule:

Article 22(3)–(7) are special provisions permitting preventive detention. They are exceptions to ordinary rights under Articles 19 and 21, but subject to constitutional safeguards.

Application:

The Court upheld the NSA but emphasized that procedural safeguards (communication of grounds, right to representation, advisory board review) must be strictly followed.

Conclusion:

Preventive detention laws are constitutional, but must operate within strict procedural limits to prevent abuse.

CASE 4: Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 5 SCC 244

Facts:

A woman was detained under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act for alleged involvement in selling expired drugs.

Issue:

Whether preventive detention is justified when ordinary criminal law is sufficient.

Rule:

Preventive detention is an exceptional measure; it cannot be used when ordinary criminal law can effectively deal with the situation.

Application:

The Court quashed the detention, holding that vague or routine justifications such as “public order” cannot justify preventive detention.

Conclusion:

Preventive detention should not be used as a substitute for ordinary law; it must be based on real, imminent danger to public order.

VI. CRITICISM AND JUDICIAL CONTROL

Criticisms

• Contrary to human rights — allows punishment without trial.
• Subjective satisfaction of the executive weakens rule of law.
• Possibility of misuse for political or personal reasons.
• Contradicts presumption of innocence and due process of law.

Judicial Safeguards

Courts have evolved checks such as:

1. Grounds of detention must be communicated clearly.
2. Detenu must have real opportunity to make representation.
3. Detention must be reviewed by Advisory Board within prescribed time.
4. Judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 is available for mala fide or procedural violation.

VII. Conclusion

Preventive detention is a constitutional paradox — a law that curtails liberty in a Constitution that guarantees it.

Yet, it remains justified on grounds of national security and public order.

The Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence — from A.K. Gopalan to Rekha — reflects a shift from executive supremacy to constitutional oversight.

The principle today is clear:

“Preventive detention must be used with utmost care, for the shortest period, and only when absolutely necessary.” 

I. Introduction

Article 15 of the Constitution of India is a part of the Fundamental Right to Equality (Articles 14–18) under Part III.

It specifically prohibits discrimination by the State on certain prohibited grounds — religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.

It is one of the key provisions ensuring social justice, gender equality, and inclusivity in Indian society.

II. Text of Article 15

Article 15 – Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of Religion, Race, Caste, Sex or Place of Birth

1. The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them.
2. No citizen shall, on such grounds, be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction, or condition — with regard to

   (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, and places of public entertainment; or

   (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads, and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to public use.

3. Protective Discrimination: Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.
4. The State may make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
5. (Added by the 93rd Constitutional Amendment) The State can also make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes, SCs, or STs in educational institutions, including private ones (except minority institutions).

III. Essence of Article 15

• Ensures substantive equality, not merely formal equality.
• Prohibits hostile discrimination but permits affirmative action.
• Recognizes biological and social differences between men and women, allowing protective and remedial measures for women and children under Article 15(3).

IV. FIRAC ANALYSIS THROUGH IMPORTANT CASES

CASE 1: State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (AIR 1951 SC 226)

Facts:

The Government of Madras had reserved seats in state-run medical and engineering colleges for different communities, based on caste and religion. Champakam Dorairajan, a Brahmin candidate, was denied admission despite having higher marks, due to the communal reservation system.

Issue:

Whether such communal reservations based on religion, race, or caste violate Article 15(1) of the Constitution.

Rule:

Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination by the State solely on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.

Article 46 (Directive Principle) encourages promotion of weaker sections, but cannot override Fundamental Rights.

Application:

The Supreme Court held that the communal G.O. was unconstitutional as it violated Article 15(1) and 29(2). The State cannot make any reservation solely on the basis of religion, caste, etc.

Conclusion:

The communal reservation was struck down. This case directly led to the First Constitutional Amendment, 1951, inserting Article 15(4) allowing affirmative action for socially and educationally backward classes.

CASE 2: Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (AIR 1981 SC 1829)

Facts:

Air India’s service regulations required that air hostesses retire upon marriage (if within 4 years of service), upon first pregnancy, or upon attaining 35 years of age — whichever occurred earlier.

Issue:

Whether such service conditions amounted to discrimination on the basis of sex under Article 15(1) and Article 14.

Rule:

Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex, but Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women — provided they are protective, not oppressive.

Application:

The Supreme Court held that while certain service conditions can differ based on nature of work, the provisions forcing retirement on first pregnancy were manifestly arbitrary and discriminatory, violating Articles 14 and 15.

However, fixing different retirement ages for air hostesses and male pursers was upheld as based on functional differences.

Conclusion:

Pregnancy-based termination was struck down as gender discrimination, but other differential service conditions were upheld as reasonable classification.

CASE 3: Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008) 3 SCC 1

Facts:

Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 prohibited employment of women in premises where liquor was served. The provision was challenged as being discriminatory.

Issue:

Whether the law prohibiting women from working in places serving liquor violates Article 15(1) read with Article 14.

Rule:

Protective legislation under Article 15(3) must empower women, not perpetuate stereotypes. The test of constitutionality is substantive equality.

Application:

The Supreme Court held that the restriction was based on outdated notions of women’s vulnerability and morality, not on legitimate protection.

It violated Articles 14, 15, and 21 as it denied women the right to work and make independent choices.

Conclusion:

Section 30 was struck down. The judgment established the principle that protective discrimination cannot become paternalistic discrimination.

CASE 4: C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India (1979 AIR 1868)

Facts:

A female IFS officer, Ms. Muthamma, challenged a rule requiring women officers to obtain permission from the government before marriage, and allowing termination upon marriage.

Issue:

Whether such rules amounted to sex-based discrimination under Article 15.

Rule:

The Constitution guarantees equality of opportunity under Article 16(1) and prohibits sex-based discrimination under Article 15(1).

Application:

The Court observed that such service rules reflected a male chauvinistic approach inconsistent with gender equality. It directed the government to revise such discriminatory provisions.

Conclusion:

Held to be discriminatory; the Court emphasized that gender bias in service laws violates the spirit of the Constitution.

V. INTERPRETATION OF “SEX” UNDER ARTICLE 15

• The term “sex” in Article 15 refers to biological sex but has been judicially expanded to include sexual orientation and gender identity.

Case: Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1

The Supreme Court decriminalized consensual same-sex relations by reading down Section 377 IPC, holding that discrimination based on sexual orientation is also a form of sex discrimination under Articles 14, 15, and 21.

VI. PROTECTIVE DISCRIMINATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Article 15(3) and 15(4) permit special provisions for women, children, and backward classes.

Examples:

• Reservation for women in local bodies (Articles 243D & 243T).
• Women-centric laws such as the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013 — all are constitutionally justified under Article 15(3).

Thus, Article 15 ensures substantive equality through protective discrimination rather than formal equality.

VII. CONCLUSION

Article 15 embodies the heart of India’s constitutional morality — guaranteeing equality while recognizing historical disadvantages.

Gender discrimination, whether direct or indirect, violates not only Article 15(1) but also Articles 14 and 21.

Courts have evolved a progressive interpretation, moving from “protecting women” to “empowering women.” 

Ex-Post Facto Laws and the Fundamental Rights of the Accused

The principle prohibiting ex-post facto laws (a Latin phrase meaning “from a thing done afterward”) is a cornerstone of legal fairness, guaranteeing that individuals are judged by the laws that existed at the time of their actions. This prohibition is one of the most critical rights of the accused, as it protects against arbitrary punishment and legislative overreach.

Definition and Scope of Ex-Post Facto Laws

An ex-post facto law is a statute that operates retrospectively, changing the legal consequences of actions committed before the law was enacted.

In the context of criminal law, there are three primary types of laws that are prohibited as ex-post facto:

Criminalisation of Past Acts: A law that makes an act a crime, which was innocent (legal) when it was performed.

Example: If an action was legal on January 1st, a law passed on March 1st that criminalizes that action cannot be used to prosecute someone for doing it on January 1st.

Aggravation of the Crime: A law that increases the degree or severity of a crime after it was committed.

Example: If a certain form of assault was a misdemeanor on the date of the offense, a new law retrospectively reclassifying it as a felony cannot be applied to the previously committed act.

Increase in Punishment: A law that inflicts a greater or heavier penalty than the law prescribed for the offense when it was committed.

Example: If the maximum sentence for theft was one year when the theft occurred, a new law that increases the maximum sentence to five years cannot be applied to that prior theft.

Note: The prohibition against ex-post facto laws applies only to criminal laws, not to civil laws or tax laws, which may often be applied retrospectively (though this is a matter of separate legal debate).

Constitutional Protection (Focus: India’s Article 20(1))

The prohibition of ex-post facto laws is a Fundamental Right guaranteed to every person, including citizens and non-citizens, under Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitution.

Article 20(1) states:

“No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.”

This single clause encapsulates both core aspects of protection for the accused:

Aspect of Article 20(1)

Protection for the Accused

“No person shall be convicted… except for violation of a law in force at the time…”

Protection from conviction for an act that was not legally a crime when it occurred.

“nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted…”

Protection from enhanced punishment if the law governing the sentence is changed after the offense was committed.

The Exception: Beneficial Retrospection

A crucial clarification made by the Indian Judiciary (most notably in the case of Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab) is that the constitutional protection under Article 20(1) is a shield for the accused, not a sword for the State.

Therefore, if a new law is passed retrospectively reducing the penalty or offering a benefit to the accused (such as allowing release on probation), the prohibition of ex-post facto laws does not apply. The accused is allowed to benefit from the milder law (lex mitior), even if it was enacted after the offense.

Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer on the Lex Mitior Principle:

“The beacon of the fairer law, if it shows a way to mitigate the sentence or to benefit the accused, must cast its compassionate light, even retrospectively, upon the man in the dock.”

The Role in the Rights of the Accused

The protection against ex-post facto laws is critical to the rights of the accused because it upholds two indispensable legal principles:

Rule of Law and Legal Certainty: It ensures that the law is predictable and stable. A person must be able to ascertain the legal consequences of their actions before they act. Without this protection, the law would become a tool for arbitrary or politically motivated punishment.

Principle of Natural Justice (Fairness): It ensures that a person is not treated unfairly by having the rules changed on them midway. If a law were allowed to operate retrospectively to increase punishment, it would violate the basic tenets of due process and fairness.

In essence, Article 20(1) mandates that the criminal justice system must operate prospectively—the law today governs actions tomorrow, but it cannot reach backward to condemn or increase the penalty for actions taken yesterday.