1) Prohibition against Forced Labour (Article 23) #
A. Definition and scope #
Forced labour (including “begar”) means labour or service extracted from a person without real consent, where “force” is not limited to physical compulsion. It can also arise from legal compulsion or economic compulsion (poverty, desperation, unequal bargaining power), so that a person is “compelled” to work even though the choice is not genuinely free. The Supreme Court has treated payment below the legally payable minimum wage as a form of forced labour because the worker is made to work under compulsion but is denied what law guarantees.
B. Constitutional provisions #
- Article 23(1): Prohibits (i) traffic in human beings, (ii) begar, and (iii) other similar forms of forced labour; contravention is an offence punishable by law.
- Article 23(2): Permits compulsory service for public purposes, but the State must not discriminate only on grounds of religion, race, caste, class (or any of them).
- Horizontal application: Article 23 is enforceable not only against the State but also against private individuals/contractors indulging in forced labour/trafficking.
Directive Principles reinforcing Article 23 (used as interpretive aids):
- Article 39(e)–(f) (health/strength of workers; tender age of children not abused; not forced by economic necessity into unsuitable work),
- Article 42–43 (humane conditions of work; living wage), etc.
C. Key legislation (supporting enforcement) #
- Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 (identification, release, rehabilitation).
- Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (non-payment/underpayment can trigger Art 23 analysis).
- Anti-trafficking framework (e.g., Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, etc.)—invoked in Article 23 “traffic” cases.
D. Landmark case laws (Facts–Issue–Held) #
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (Asiad Workers Case) (1982) #
Facts: A public-spirited group approached the Supreme Court complaining of exploitation of workers engaged in construction for the Asiad projects—violations of labour welfare laws, underpayment, and allegations of employment of children below 14.
Issue: Whether labour extracted under exploitative conditions—especially payment below minimum wage—amounts to forced labour under Article 23; and whether Article 23/24 obligations apply even when workers are engaged through contractors.
Held: The Court held that “force” in Article 23 is not confined to physical force; economic compulsion can also create forced labour. Therefore, payment below the minimum wage (what law mandates) can amount to forced labour prohibited by Article 23. It also treated Article 23 as enforceable beyond just State action, and insisted on compliance with labour welfare statutes.
Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan (1983) #
Facts: Workers employed on famine relief works were paid less than the statutory minimum wage because a State law sought to exempt such works from minimum wage requirements.
Issue: Can the State, even for “relief works”, pay wages below the statutory minimum without violating Article 23?
Held: No. Payment below minimum wage on famine relief works violates Article 23. The State cannot justify underpayment by calling the work “relief”; fundamental rights cannot be diluted by such exemptions.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) #
Facts: An NGO alleged large-scale bonded labour in stone quarries (Faridabad region), with inhuman conditions and non-enforcement of welfare legislation; the Court appointed commissioners and sought reports.
Issue: Whether bonded labour conditions violate Article 23, and what constitutional duties the State has to identify, release and protect bonded labourers through Article 32 proceedings.
Held: The Court affirmed that bonded labour is directly hit by Article 23; it adopted an expansive remedial approach under Article 32, issued directions for identification, release, and enforcement of labour welfare laws, and linked forced labour to the right to live with dignity (Article 21) in constitutional enforcement.
Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of M.P. (1984) #
Facts: Even after formal release, freed bonded labourers were not meaningfully rehabilitated and were vulnerable to slipping back into bondage due to poverty and social power structures.
Issue: Whether the State’s failure to rehabilitate released bonded labourers defeats constitutional and statutory protections connected with Article 23.
Held: The Court stressed that release without rehabilitation is illusory, and the State must implement rehabilitation obligations so the freed workers are not driven back into bonded labour—thereby giving Article 23 practical content alongside Article 21.
Vishal Jeet v. Union of India (1990) #
Facts: PIL highlighted trafficking of women/children and forced prostitution (including devadasi/jogin practices), seeking systemic directions.
Issue: How broadly “traffic in human beings” in Article 23 should be understood, and what directions may be issued for prevention/rehabilitation.
Held: The Court treated “traffic” as a wide expression and issued directions emphasizing preventive action, law enforcement, and rehabilitation-oriented measures through coordinated State action.
2) Prohibition of Child Labour (Article 24) — Constitutional Law Note #
A. Definition #
Child labour (constitutional sense) refers to employment of a child in work that the Constitution forbids due to the child’s age and vulnerability, especially where the work is hazardous or performed in settings like factories and mines. The constitutional focus is on protecting childhood from exploitation and ensuring development, dignity, and education.
B. Constitutional provisions #
- Article 24: “No child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment.”
- Article 21A (Right to Education, 6–14 years) + Article 45 (early childhood care) reinforce that children belong in school and safe development, not labour markets.
- Article 39(e)–(f) (DPSP) supplies constitutional policy against abuse of tender age and economic compulsion driving children into unsuitable work.
C. Statutory framework (current position) #
- Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 (as amended by the 2016 Amendment):
- Complete prohibition of employment of children below 14 in all occupations and processes (with limited statutory exceptions), and
- prohibition of employment of adolescents (14–18) in hazardous occupations/processes.
D. Landmark case laws #
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) #
Facts: Along with forced labour allegations, the petition raised that children below 14 were employed in construction work connected with the Asiad projects.
Issue: Whether employing children below 14 in such construction activity violates Article 24, and whether the Court can enforce this through constitutional remedies.
Held: The Court treated construction work as falling within the protective scope of Article 24 where hazardous conditions exist, and directed enforcement of the constitutional prohibition and labour welfare standards.
Labourers Working on Salal Hydroelectric Project v. State of J&K (1984) #
Facts: Reports/inspection indicated labour law violations at the Salal project site, including presence of minors engaged in work at/around the construction project.
Issue: Whether construction work is “hazardous employment” for Article 24 purposes and whether the State/Central agencies must ensure compliance at large project sites.
Held: The Court emphasized that construction work is hazardous, and therefore children below 14 cannot be employed; it issued directions to ensure compliance with Article 24 and associated labour welfare obligations at the project.
M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (Child Labour in Sivakasi) (1996) #
Facts: The petition highlighted large-scale employment of children in match/fireworks industries (Sivakasi being a prominent focus), despite constitutional and statutory prohibitions.
Issue: How to give effective enforcement to Article 24 and child labour legislation; what remedial framework should be adopted to remove children from hazardous work while ensuring rehabilitation/education.
Held: The Court prohibited child employment in hazardous industries, directed surveys/identification, and ordered a structured rehabilitation approach (including education-oriented measures and a welfare-fund type mechanism to support transition from labour to schooling).
Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India (2011) (Children in Circuses/Trafficking–Labour) #
Facts: The petition documented trafficking and exploitation of children in circuses, including forced performances, abuse, and denial of normal childhood and education.
Issue: Whether such practices violate constitutional protections (including the child-protection framework connected with Articles 23–24) and what directions are required for rescue and rehabilitation.
Held: The Court issued extensive directions to curb trafficking and exploitation in circuses, focusing on rescue, protection and rehabilitation—strengthening constitutional commitments against child exploitation and forced labour-like conditions.
Conclusion #
Articles 23 and 24 form the Constitution’s core anti-exploitation code: Article 23 attacks labour extracted through coercion (including poverty-driven compulsion) and trafficking, while Article 24 places a categorical ban on hazardous employment of children below 14. Through PIL jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has converted these guarantees into enforceable governance duties—identification, prevention, prosecution, and rehabilitation/education-oriented remedies—ensuring that the “Right against Exploitation” is not merely declaratory but operational in real life.