Arbitrariness

Meaning #

In constitutional law, arbitrariness means State action based on will, whim, caprice, or personal discretion, rather than reason, law, fairness, and relevant considerations. It is the opposite of the Rule of Law, which requires that power must be exercised according to legal standards and not personal preference.

Constitutional basis #

Although the word “arbitrary” does not appear in Article 14, the Supreme Court has read into Article 14 a guarantee that:

• State action must be fair, non-discriminatory, and non-arbitrary
• Equality is not merely “treat like alike”; it also requires that the State must act reasonably and with fairness

So, Article 14 functions as:

1. Equality before law and equal protection, and
2. A check on arbitrary State power.

How arbitrariness became a ground under Article 14 #

Initially, Article 14 was applied mainly through the traditional “classification test”:

• There must be intelligible differentia, and
• That differentia must have a rational nexus with the object of the law.

But constitutional experience showed: even without obvious “class discrimination”, a decision could still be unfair and irrational. This led to the modern understanding that:

“Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies.”
If an action is arbitrary, it is unequal, and therefore violates Article 14.

This doctrinal shift is classically associated with E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) and was further developed later (especially in Maneka Gandhi and later service/administrative law cases).

Where arbitrariness review applies #

Arbitrariness under Article 14 is used to test:

• Legislation (laws that are manifestly arbitrary / unreasonable)
• Executive and administrative action (transfers, appointments, policy decisions, licensing, tenders, etc.)
• State instrumentalities (public authorities, statutory bodies, government companies when “State” under Article 12)

Key indicators of arbitrariness #

Courts generally look for:

• No rational basis / decision not supported by reasons
• Irrelevant considerations taken into account
• Relevant considerations ignored
• Mala fides (bad faith) or colourable exercise of power
• Unequal treatment without justification
• Unfairness / lack of procedural fairness (where required)

E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) #

Background context #

This case arose out of senior civil service postings in Tamil Nadu involving a very high-ranking IAS officer. The dispute was not about “caste/class discrimination”, but about fairness of State action in moving a senior officer from a key post and appointing a junior to that post.

Facts #

• E. P. Royappa was a senior IAS officer in the Tamil Nadu cadre.
• He was appointed as Chief Secretary around November 1969, but only in an officiating capacity (not as a confirmed/substantive Chief Secretary).
• The earlier Chief Secretary (C. A. Ramakrishnan) was said to be holding a lien on the post during leave, meaning Royappa did not become the substantive holder of the post.
• Due to later developments and changes in the administration, Royappa was moved from the Chief Secretary’s post and was offered an alternative posting such as Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission (treated as a non-cadre / different kind of post in his argument).
• Royappa did not join the offered post and went on leave. Even after being directed to join, he again did not assume the post.
• Subsequently, he was offered another post (e.g., Officer on Special Duty), which he also did not join.
• Meanwhile, according to Royappa, a junior IAS officer was appointed as Chief Secretary, which he claimed amounted to supersession, humiliation, and victimisation.

Petition and constitutional challenge #

Royappa approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, alleging violation of:

• Article 14 (equality), and
• Article 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment)

He also alleged mala fides and claimed that repeated transfers/postings were:

• arbitrary,
• discriminatory, and
• politically motivated / punitive in effect.

Issues #

1. Does an IAS officer have a legally enforceable (vested) right to continue as Chief Secretary (or to insist on a particular posting)?
2. Whether the State’s action of transferring / posting Royappa and appointing a junior as Chief Secretary was arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16?
3. Whether allegations of mala fides were proved so as to invalidate the State action?
4. Most importantly (doctrinal issue): Is arbitrariness itself a facet of inequality under Article 14?

Held #

• The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
• It held, on the facts, that:
  • Royappa had no substantive/vested right to the post of Chief Secretary.
  • The postings offered to him were not shown (on the evidence) to be arbitrary or unconstitutional.
  • The allegations of mala fides failed because they were not proved with sufficient material; bad faith is not presumed, and the burden of proof lies on the person alleging it.

So, Royappa did not get relief.

Reasoning (why he lost on facts) #

The Court essentially reasoned that:

• High-level postings and transfers in the civil service are generally within the administrative discretion of the government, provided the action is legal and not mala fide.
• Since Royappa was not the substantive Chief Secretary, he could not claim a guaranteed right to remain there.
• The government offered him posts of rank/status, and his own non-joining weakened the case that he was being unlawfully “pushed out” without options.
• Mere allegations of political motivation or humiliation are not enough; specific proof is required.

The constitutional importance (why it is remembered) #

Even though Royappa lost, the case is a milestone because the Court delivered a powerful doctrinal statement on Article 14:

• Equality is a dynamic concept, not confined to old, rigid formulas.
• Arbitrariness and equality cannot coexist.
• If State action is arbitrary, it is inherently unequal, and therefore violates Article 14.

In short, the case helped move Article 14 from a narrow “classification-only” approach to a broader guarantee of non-arbitrariness in State action—especially in administrative and service matters.

Principle #

Principle from E. P. Royappa:

• Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action.
• Arbitrariness is antithetic to equality.
• Equality under the Constitution is not merely formal; it requires fairness and reasonableness in government action.

Justice P. N. Bhagwati explained that Article 14’s equality is not a narrow, mechanical idea—it is a dynamic guarantee that cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined” within old, doctrinaire limits; therefore, “equality is antithetic to arbitrariness” and the two are “sworn enemies”—because equality belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while arbitrariness belongs to the whim and caprice of absolute power; accordingly, Bhagwati J. reasoned that when State action is arbitrary, inequality is built into it, and that very arbitrariness makes the action violative of Article 14.

Conclusion #

From a constitutional law point of view, arbitrariness is unconstitutional because it violates the essence of Article 14—fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory governance. E. P. Royappa is the turning point where the Supreme Court clearly framed the idea that Article 14 is not only about classification; it is also a safeguard against arbitrary State power, even in areas like transfers and high-level postings.