1) Constitutional scheme and meaning #

The Constitution adopts positive secularism: the State has no religion of its own, but it protects religious liberty while ensuring equality, dignity, social reform, public order and other Fundamental Rights.

Key provisions

• Article 25 (Individual right): Freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion — subject to public order, morality, health and the other Fundamental Rights (Part III).
  • Art. 25(2)(a): State may regulate or restrict economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice.
  • Art. 25(2)(b): State may make laws for social welfare and reform, including throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes/sections of Hindus.
• Article 26 (Group/denominational right): Every “religious denomination” has the right to
  (a) establish/maintain institutions, (b) manage its affairs in matters of religion, (c) own/acquire property, and (d) administer property according to law.
• Article 27: No person shall be compelled to pay taxes for promotion/maintenance of any particular religion.
• Article 28: Regulates religious instruction in educational institutions (especially State-funded/State-recognized).

2) What counts as “religion” and what is protected? #

Courts treat religion as including beliefs, doctrines, and rituals regarded by the faith as religious. But every activity done by a religious group is not automatically “religion”—many things are secular/administrative/economic and can be regulated under Art. 25(2)(a) and Art. 26(d).

3) Essential Religious Practices (ERP) Test (Doctrine) #

Origin & core idea #

The Supreme Court evolved the “Essential Religious Practices” doctrine to decide which practices are truly religious (and hence protected) versus secular or non-essential (and hence regulable).

In Shayara Bano, the Court’s discussion restates the classic formulation from Shirur Mutt:
what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion.

How the test is applied (exam-ready steps) #

Courts typically ask:

1. Is the practice religious in character or merely secular/associated?
2. If religious, is it essential/integral to the religion/denomination (as per doctrines/tenets)?
3. Even if essential, is it limited by public order, morality, health, or other FRs (equality, dignity, etc.)?
4. Can it be regulated as secular activity associated with religion (Art. 25(2)(a))?

Important caution: Durgah Committee #

The Court warned that not everything claimed in the name of religion deserves constitutional protection; courts may reject mere accretions/superstitious practices not truly essential.

Landmark case laws #

Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay (1954) #

Facts: The validity of parts of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was challenged where the statutory scheme enabled significant State control over religious trusts, including provisions allowing the Charity Commissioner’s role in trusteeship even for religious institutions.
Issues: Whether State control under the Act (as applied to religious institutions like temples/maths) violates Arts. 25–26 by interfering with religious autonomy.
Held: The Court struck down some provisions (notably those allowing appointment of the Charity Commissioner as trustee for any public trust without safeguards for religious institutions) as unconstitutional.
Principle: The State may regulate administration, but cannot take over/replace the core religious management in a way that destroys denominational autonomy.

Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (1962) #

Facts: Dispute arose regarding management and religious practices connected to the Durgah at Ajmer under statutory administration, raising questions about what practices were truly religious and protected.
Issues: Scope of protection of “religious practices” under Art. 25, and whether all claimed practices are protected.
Held: The Court cautioned that constitutional protection does not automatically extend to practices that are not truly essential to religion and may treat non-essential accretions/superstitious practices differently.
Principle: Courts can scrutinize whether a practice is genuinely essential.

Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay (1962) #

Facts: The Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949 made excommunication invalid. The religious head of the Dawoodi Bohra community challenged the law, claiming it violated religious/denominational rights.
Issues: Whether the Act infringed the Fundamental Rights of the denomination and its head under Arts. 25–26 (and its interaction with Art. 17 arguments).
Held: The challenge succeeded: the Act was held unconstitutional for infringing protected religious/denominational freedom in the manner it operated against the community’s religious head/denomination.
Principle: Where a matter is genuinely “in matters of religion”, State cannot extinguish the denomination’s protected sphere (subject to limitations/social reform in appropriate cases).

Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977) #

Facts: MP and Odisha laws prohibited forcible/fraudulent conversions and made them punishable; their constitutional validity was challenged.
Issues:

1. Does Art. 25(1) (right to “propagate”) include a right to convert another person?
2. Are such anti-conversion laws within State legislative power and justified for public order?
   Held: The Court upheld the laws; “propagate” does not include a fundamental right to convert another person, and preventing forcible/fraudulent conversion is consistent with maintaining public order.
   Principle: Religious freedom protects voluntary belief, but the State may curb coercion/fraud in conversions.

Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986) #

Facts: School children belonging to Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to sing the National Anthem due to genuine religious conscience; they stood respectfully. The State treated it as misconduct. The case directly raised Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 25(1) in this context.
Issues: Whether compelling singing of the National Anthem despite a sincere religious objection violates Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 25(1); and whether refusal itself is an offence/misconduct.
Held: The Court protected the students’ liberty of conscience: respectful non-participation grounded in faith could not be punished as disrespect; compulsion would violate fundamental freedoms.
Principle: Freedom of conscience is the heart of Art. 25.

Church of God (Full Gospel) in India v. K.K.R. Majestic Colony Welfare Association (2000) #

Facts: Residents objected to prayer meetings using microphones/loudspeakers and drums creating noise disturbance.
Issues: Can a religious group claim a right to create noise pollution in the name of religion; how to balance religious practice with others’ rights and public peace.
Held: The Court held no religion requires disturbing others’ peace; use of loudspeakers/drums that disrupts neighbourhood tranquility cannot be justified as a protected religious right.
Principle: Religious freedom is subject to public order and the rights of others.

Essential Religious Practice (ERP) & Gender Justice — the two major modern cases #

Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) — Triple Talaq (Talaq-e-biddat) #

Facts: Shayara Bano challenged the practice of talaq-e-biddat (instant triple talaq) after marital disputes and a unilateral divorce being effected, and also questioned allied practices (the Court confined itself to triple talaq at that stage).
Issues:

1. Whether talaq-e-biddat is protected by Art. 25 as an essential religious practice.
2. Whether it violates constitutional guarantees (notably equality/dignity).
   Held (Final result): By a majority 3:2, the Supreme Court set aside the practice of talaq-e-biddat (triple talaq).

How ERP test mattered in Shayara Bano (exam-focus) #

• The Court records the argument that every practice claimed by faith is not necessarily “integral”, and talaq-e-biddat cannot be treated as an essential religious practice for Art. 25 protection.
• The classic Shirur Mutt formulation of ERP—“essential part… ascertained with reference to doctrines”—is expressly invoked in the case’s ERP discussion.
• On constitutional scrutiny, the judgment applies equality-based review and treats instant, irrevocable triple talaq as fundamentally defective and constitutionally unsustainable (including discussion on “manifest arbitrariness” under Article 14 in the reasoning leading to invalidation).

One-line principle: Personal law practices, when tested in constitutional adjudication, cannot claim Art. 25 shelter if they fail the “essential practice” inquiry and/or collapse under equality/dignity norms.

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (Sabarimala) (2018) #

Facts: The challenge was to the practice/custom (and enabling rule) that excluded women aged about 10–50 (menstruating age) from entering the Sabarimala temple; the Kerala High Court earlier upheld the exclusion based on the deity’s naishtika brahmacharya form and related custom.
Issues (framed in the case):

• Whether exclusion is an “essential religious practice” under Art. 25.
• Whether Sabarimala is a religious denomination and can claim protection under Art. 26, especially given statutory management/state funding arguments.
• Whether Rule 3 enabling exclusion violates Arts. 14 and 15.
  Held (core outcome): The majority struck down the exclusion as unconstitutional (on equality and constitutional morality reasoning) and rejected the claim that such exclusion is protected as an essential religious practice. (The judgment contains a notable dissent as well.)

Why it is pertinent here: Sabarimala is one of the leading modern examples of ERP doctrine colliding with equality and dignity, especially in gender-based exclusion.

Note (procedural posture): The Sabarimala verdict led to review/linked questions being considered further by the Court in later proceedings; many textbooks now mention this “continuing” constitutional debate.

4) “Mosque / place of worship” and ERP #

Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994) (illustrative ERP reasoning) #

Facts: Challenge to acquisition legislation relating to the Ayodhya area raised issues touching religious freedom and whether acquisition of a mosque/land interferes with Art. 25.
Issue: Whether a mosque is an essential part of Islamic religious practice such that it is immune from State action like acquisition.
Held (often-cited proposition): The judgment is frequently cited for observing that a mosque is not essential for offering namaz, which can be offered elsewhere; hence acquisition per se was not barred on that reasoning.
Use in exams: It shows how the Court sometimes uses ERP reasoning to decide whether a place or practice is constitutionally indispensable.

5) Short conclusion #

Freedom of religion under Arts. 25–28 guarantees conscience and religious liberty but not as an absolute claim. The Constitution permits the State to regulate secular aspects associated with religion and to pursue social reform. The Essential Religious Practices test (rooted in Shirur Mutt formulation) asks whether a disputed practice is truly integral to the faith, while Durgah Committee warns against protecting non-essential accretions. Modern cases show the balancing role clearly: Shayara Bano (2017) set aside instant triple talaq by majority and engaged ERP/equality reasoning, while Sabarimala (2018) tested a long-standing exclusion against ERP and equality norms.